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Rather, his statement, “I don’t see why there’s any point to continue talking,” was conditioned upon his statement that “if you guys are automatically charging me.” In addition, it was made in the context of continued professions of innocence, i.e., “Nothing happened.” See State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 396-98 (1992).

.” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 12 When, as in this case, a defendant’s post-Miranda confession is preceded by an earlier confession that violated his Miranda rights, we have articulated five factors which guide our analysis under part I, article 15 as to whether the second confession was v

On appeal, in reviewing the trial court’s finding that the State met its burden, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 695 (1994); State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400-01 (1992).

State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 401 (1992) (two-and-a-half-hour interview was not oppressive or inordinately long).

Cf State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 401 (1992) (confession voluntary even though defendant was inebriated at the time of confession).

at 431 (quotation omitted); see State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400-01 (1992) (“[Pjroof of a deranged or deficient mental state may be highly significant in determining whether any given police conduct was overbearing in its effect.” (quotation omitted)).

It is the State’s burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s constitutional rights under Miranda were not violated before it is permitted to admit a defendant’s statements into evidence.

State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400-01 (1992) (defendant’s inebriation did not undermine voluntariness of confession).

“[Tjfae State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights under Miranda before the defendant’s [statements] may be admitted as evidence.” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 394 (1992).

Describing the charges that a suspect may face or the implications of his actions “is not inherently coercive and does not render a confession involuntary.” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 399-400 (1992); see also State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 693 (1994).

Thus, whether the interview was coercive should have been measured by the nature of the interview within the context of Wesley’s abilities.

That Sergeant Kelleher knew the defendant was undergoing counseling and that the defendant was taking antidepressant medication does not mean that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because there “was nothing coercive, deceptive, or overbearing in the police’s conduct.” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 401, 605 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1992) (confession voluntary where, although police knew the defendant was intoxicated, they did not take advantage of the intoxicated defendant).

Such a finding is entitled to stand unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 399, 605 A.2d 1055, 1061 (1992) (quotations, citations, and ellipses omitted).

Our constitution, however, is offended only by State action, see State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400, 605 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1992); cf. State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 325, 470 A.2d 900, 905 (1983) (“neither the government nor any of its agents had any power to violate or infringe upon [defendant’s State constitutional] rights”), and thus, even “[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure

Because the State Constitution provides at least as much protection to the defendant’s individual liberties in this context as does the Federal Constitution, we will address the claims under the State Constitution first and look to the decisions of the federal courts only for guidance.

In the area of confessions, “the determination of voluntariness [is] made in light of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747, 474 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1984) (quotation omitted); “an inquiry into a confessor’s mental condition can never be dispositive in applying the constitutional concept of voluntariness,” State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400, 605 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1992) (quotation omitted).

State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 401, 605 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1992) (intoxicated defendant’s confession to the police while in custody was voluntary due to non-coercive and non-deceptive atmosphere surrounding the confession).

The State had the burden at trial of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily confessed.