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When enacting legislation, the legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law.

ted a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the money was not used for parts, but rather to gamble, the State’s indictments did not contain any such allegation.” The State was not required, however, to allege how the defendant ultimately used the money he obtained from his victims, because an indictment “need not state the specific means by which the crime was carried out.” State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 366 (1992).

“In enacting legislation, the legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law: we will not construe a statute as abrogating the common law unless the statute clearly expresses such an intention.” State v. Hermsdorf, 4 135 N.H. 360, 363 (1992) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57, 74 (2011) (“We have often stated that we will not interpret a statute to abrogate the common law unless the statute clearly expresses that intent.” (quotation omitted)).

The defendant cites State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360 (1992) to support his contention that when “the State charges a defendant with committing the ‘aiding/abetting’ variant of RSA 167:17-b, I(a), the jury must find that the principal also committed the elements of the charged crime.” Hermsdorf provides little guidance here.

whether it contained the elements of the offense and enough facts to warn the accused of the specific charges against him.” State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 366 (1992).

“We have often stated that we will not interpret a statute to abrogate the common law unless the statute clearly expresses that intent.” State v. Elementis Chem., 152 N.H. 794, 803 (2005) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 363 (1992) (“In enacting legislation, the legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law: we will not construe a statute as abrogating the common law unless the statute clearly expresses such an intention.” (quotations omitted)).

We do not, in general, interpret a statute to abrogate the common law absent a clear legislative expression of intent to do so.

Nottingham makes a passing comment in its brief that “DES should have developed a stringent set of permitting standards or regulations for an applicant to meet.” Even if we took this to be an argument, however, we would consider it waived due to Nottingham’s failure to adequately brief it.

State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 366 (1992); State v. Burley, 137 N.H. 286, 289 (1993).

State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 363 (1992); see also Douglas v. Fulis, 138 N.H. 740, 742 (1994).

Thus, we consider the equal protection argument waived.

“[W]e will not construe a statute as abrogating the common law unless the statute clearly expresses such an intention.” State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 363 (1992) (quotations omitted).

Finally, the claimants argue that MTA waived the issues appealed because “the questions presented for review were not raised by the MTA in the appeal below, but rather by the State of New Hampshire itself.” We conclude, however, that the claimants waived this argument by failing to make more than this passing reference to it in their brief.

State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 364-65 (1992) (summarizing the burden on the proponent of secondary evidence under the “best evidence rule”).

We presume that the legislature was aware of our prior decisions exempting attorneys from the Act, see State v. Hermsdorf 135 N.H. 360, 363, 605 A.2d 1045, 1047 (1992), and has adopted our construction of the Act by amending other sections of the statute while failing to amend it to include lawyers, see Del Norte, Inc. v. Provencher, 142 N.H. 535, 539, 703 A.2d 890, 893 (1997).

The question is not whether the indictment could have been more certain and comprehensive, but whether it contains the elements of the offense and enough facts to warn the defendant of the specific charges against him.

The defendant does not further elaborate upon this argument; accordingly, we do not stop to ponder its implications and instead consider it waived.

Ct. R. 16(3)(b); State v. Peterson, 135 N.H. 713, 714-15, 609 A.2d 749, 750-51 (1992), or did not brief them adequately, State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 365, 605 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1992).

Because his constitutional arguments were not adequately briefed and argued, however, we decline to address them.

Because this claim has been made, if at all, only in “passing reference,” we do not consider it.

State v. Hermsdorf, 135 N.H. 360, 363, 605 A.2d 1045, 1047 (1992) (“In enacting legislation, the legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law.”).

Because the defendants, in their brief, mention their objection to the May deposition testimony only in passing and without specifying which statements were hearsay, we will not address that testimony separately.

As the defendant’s other issues were, at most, only mentioned in passing in the defendant’s brief, we consider them waived.