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They emphasize that “tenants and subtenants may be owners of property with a sufficient ownership interest to pursue land use approvals independently of the fee simple titleholder or landlord.” See Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 37 (1991) (interpreting the phrase “then record owner of the premises” to apply to all persons having record interests in the property, thus entitling a lessee under a recorded lease to notice of a mortgage foreclosure under RSA 479:25, II).

Div. R. 2.7(A); see Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 35 (1991) (explaining that a trial court has discretion to grant intervenor status when the intervenor has a “right involved in the trial and his interest [is] direct and apparent” (emphases and quotation omitted)).

“[T]he right to intervene has been usually determined as a matter of discretion by the Trial Court.” Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 34 (1991) (quotation omitted).

In making this argument, the plaintiff mistakenly relies upon Snyder v. New Hampshire Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32 (1991).

Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 37 (1991) (lessee whose lease has been recorded is entitled to notice of foreclosure sale).

To the extent that the prior statute was ambiguous with respect to whether mental health services were included, we believe that the 1996 amendment that first specified “mental health services” is more properly viewed as an attempt to resolve any ambiguity rather than as a change in legal rights.

A trial court should grant a motion to intervene if the party seeking to intervene has a right involved in the trial and a direct and apparent interest therein.

The children point to the traditional intervention test, which provides: “A person who seeks to intervene in a case must have a right involved in the trial and his interest must be direct and apparent; such as would suffer if not indeed be sacrificed were the court to deny the privilege.” Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 35 (1991) (quotations, brackets and emphasis omitted).

A trial court should grant a motion to intervene if the party seeking to intervene has a right involved in the trial and a direct and apparent interest therein.

is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights.” Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 36 (1991) (quotation omitted).

Here Sternenberg sought to intervene solely “for the purposes [sic] of having counsel present during her testimony.” Consequently, the trial court’s grant of her motion to inter *278 vene may well have been an abuse of discretion not challenged here.

A trial court’s decision to grant intervenor status will not be overturned unless we are persuaded that the court abused its discretion.

It is argued that the procedure used by Keene Sentinel in seeking to intervene was improper because the newspaper’s interest is not “ ‘direct and apparent.’ ” R. WIEBUSCH, 4 New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure § 176, at 129-30 (1984) (quoting Pike v. Pike, 24 N.H. 384, 394 (1852)); see also Snyder v. N.H. Savings Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 34, 592 A.2d 506, 507 (1991) (right to intervene is determined as matter of discretion of trial court).