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3 that which is articulated by the legislature; thus, New Hampshire courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over an action against the State “unless the legislature has prescribed the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted.” Lorenz, 152 N.H. at 634 (quotation and brackets omitted); see LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 566-67 (1991).

Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question, LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 566 (1991), subject to de novo review, see, e.g., In the Matter of Mallett & Mallett, 163 N.H. 202, 207 (2012).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the standard we apply is “whether or not the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 564 (1991).

“The standard this court applies in reviewing a motion to dismiss is whether or not the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 564 (1991).

Though the trial court did not directly address this issue, we do so because sovereign immunity is a question of subject matter *38 jurisdiction, see LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 566-67 (1991), which cannot be conferred by consent of the parties.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss on appeal, we ask whether “the plaintiffs allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 564 (1991).

RSA 541-B:19; LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 566-67, 594 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (1991).

LaRoche Adm'r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 569, 594 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1991) (“It is not our province to consider [an issue] here, when it was not raised below.”).

LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 567, 594 A.2d 1297, *209 1301 (1991); Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 345, 341 A.2d 282, 285-86 (1975).

Taking the allegations of fact in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 564, 594 A.2d 1297, 1299 (1991), we find that there was no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss for the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to allege that the city had actual notice of the purported insufficiencies.

*189 ERG contends that the court’s dismissal of the writ in McCoole v. Barnes & a. for failure to state a cause of action was based merely on a procedural defect in the pleadings, and that under this court’s holding in LaRoche, Administrator v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 565, 594 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1991), a new writ could be refiled at a later date.

Because the plaintiff’s amendment incorporates the facts of the initial complaint and alleges only conclusions of law, see Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987), and because the proposed amendment would not cure the defect in the writ, see LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 568, 594 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1991), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss on appeal, we ask whether “the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construe *256 tion that would permit recovery.” LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 564, 594 A.2d 1297, 1299 (1991).

to deny a motion for leave to amend where the proposed amendment does not cure the defect in the writ.” LaRoche, Adm’r. v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 568, 594 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1991).