Cited by

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 77 (1991) (“The trial court.

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78-79 (1991).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 76-78 (1991) (distinguishing dismissal based upon prima facie standard, like dismissal for failure to state a claim, from dismissal following a bench trial based upon plaintiff’s failure to meet the burden of proof).

bills; as the court stated, utility companies “don’t know the relationship between the people.” The petitioner argues that, after the trial court denied the son’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of her case, evidence of the decedent’s “claimed omissions” or failure to acknowledge her as his wife was “not enough to rebut [her] case.” Cf. Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 76 (1991) (allowing trial court to render judgment for defendant upon motion to dismiss at clos

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78-79 (1991).

The standard the court typically applies at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief takes “the evidence presented and determine[s] if, viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, it establishes a prima facie case.” Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 75 (1991).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 75 (1991); see also Morrill v. Tilney, 128 N.H. 773, 777 (1986).

oncluding the evidentiaiy hearing, the trial court granted the Water District’s motion and stated in its order: “I do not find that [Durgin’s] evidence today supports an implied private contract.” From the trial court order, it is unclear to us as to how the court treated the motion to dismiss, based upon our discussion of the two types of such motions in Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 76-78 (1991).

“A finding of waiver must be based upon an intention expressed in explicit language to forego a right, or upon conduct under the circumstances justifying an inference of a relinquishment of it.” Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 79 (1991) (quotation omitted).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 79 (1991); Bowen v. Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 107, 112 (1954).

Bergodere, 40 F.3d at 516; cf. Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 75-78, 600 A.2d 448, 450-52 (1991).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 75-76, 600 A.2d 448, 450-51 (1991) (stating standard of review for motion for nonsuit at close of plaintiff’s case in a bench trial).

At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to impose a constructive trust under the preponderance of the evidence standard enunciated in Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78, 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991).

At the conclusion of the Patches’ case, the trial judge granted Highview Realty’s motion to dismiss, finding that the evidence presented by the Patches failed to establish their case under the standard set forth in Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 75-78, 600 A.2d 448, 451-52 (1991).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78, 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991).

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78, 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991).

In Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78, 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991), we held that: “[W]hen the trial judge is sitting as the trier of fact, he or she appropriately may make findings of fact at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, and may use such facts to determine whether the plaintiff has established the case by a preponderance of the evidence.