Cited by

While “absolute certainty” is not required, Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 296 (1992), damages cannot be awarded for “speculative losses.” Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust and Kenneth Dash Partnership, 142 N.H. 501, 517 (1997) (quotation omitted).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 279 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he immunity of government from liability on contracts has never been regarded as applicable to local governmental units” (quotation omitted)).

5 an individual.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 278-79 (1992) (quotation omitted); see also RSA 31:3 (2000) (authorizing municipal corporations to make contracts); RSA 31:1 (2000) (stating that municipalities may sue and be sued).

erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by the evidence.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 287 (1992) (quotations omitted); see Sutton v. Town of Gilford, 160 N.H. 43, 55 (2010).

It noted that “implied covenants are qualified and restrained by any express covenants of a more limited character,” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 284 (1992) (quotation omitted), and concluded that the Governor’s authority under the Lease comported with his power under RSA 4:40 to reject any proposed lease amendment.

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 293 (1992).

First, we have stated that promissory estoppel “serves to impute contractual stature based upon an underlying promise.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 290 (1992).

1973); see Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282 (1992) (mixed questions of law and fact concern the application of a rule of law to the facts and the consequent determination of whether the rule is satisfied).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282 (1992) (mixed questions of law and fact concern the application of a rule of law to the facts and the consequent determination of whether the rule is satisfied); see also State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999).

“[T]he language of a contract is ambiguous if the parties to the contract could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of that language.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 288 (1992) (quotation omitted).

“The application of estoppel rests largely on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 289 (1992) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 292, 608 A.2d 840, 854 (1992).

Equitable estoppel “serves to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 290, 608 A.2d 840, 853 (1992) (quotation omitted).

“In reviewing damages awards, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we will not disturb the decision of the factfinder unless it is clearly erroneous.” Great *466 Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 295, 608 A.2d 840, 856 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282, 608 A.2d 840, 848 (1992).

When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute “and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992) *644 (quotation omitted).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 290, 608 A.2d 840, 853 (1992).

We concur and therefore review the superior court’s ruling according to the standard set forth in Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 608 A.2d 840 (1992).

In New Hampshire, we have “not merely one rule of implied good faith duty[,] but rather a series of doctrines, each of them serving markedly different functions.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 293, 608 A.2d 840, 855 (1992) (quotation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

Bearing this purpose in mind, and ascribing to the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, see Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992), we are persuaded that “prosperity” refers to a community’s fiscal well-being, and not to an individual’s financial interest, cf. Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991) (construing general welfare provision of zoning enabling statute as including welfar

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 280, 608 A.2d 840, 847 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282, 608 A.2d 840, 848 (1992).

“As a first step in statutory construction, we examine the language found in the statute itself, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992) (quotation and citations omitted).

Where discovery ultimately yields relevant evidence, the trial court’s admission of the evidence “will not be disturbed unless it is clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the case.” Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 295, 608 A.2d 840, 856 (1992) (quotation omitted); see also N.H. R. Ev.

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992).

*300 When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute, Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992), “and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Id.

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 295, 608 A.2d 840, 856 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282, 608 A.2d 840, 848 (1992).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 296, 608 A.2d 840, 857 (1992) (citation omitted).

See, e.g., Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 297, 608 A.2d 840, 857 (1992) (vacating damages to extent that award included lost profits); Hydraform Prods.

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 290, 608 A.2d 840, 853 (1992).