Cited by

“[T]o forsake [the plaintiffs’] reasonable development plans after all the time, effort and capital invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable.” Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 443 (1991).

st Provision” because “the BOC and ZBA, in applying the Guest Provision in the instant case, adopted an interpretation that would not allow any rentals in the KLP unless they were owner occupied.” The trial court noted that the plaintiffs specifically argued that this application restricts affordable housing within the KLP and therefore “conflicts with the holding in Britton v. [Town of] Chester, 134 N.H. 434 (1991), in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that municipal zoning regul

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 442 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

Notwithstanding our “longstanding policy against reaching a constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on other grounds,” Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991), we choose to reach the constitutional issue, without deciding the statutory question, for reasons of judicial economy.

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 444 (1991).

is delegated to it by the State, and the municipality must, therefore, exercise this power in conformance with the enabling legislation.” Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

CRJ asserts, “By specifically targeting, and then categorically banning, this essential community service from within the City’s borders, this part of the Ordinance contravenes the general welfare provision of [RSA] 674:16.” See Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991) (“It is not...

Specifically, NCES argues that the amendment is improper because it distinguishes between users of land, not uses of land, see Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar’s Head District, 101 N.H. 460, 463-64 (1958), and because it contravenes the general welfare of the region it affects, see Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991) (not within the power of this court to act as a “super zoning board”).

*789 Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 440-41 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991).

Bearing this purpose in mind, and ascribing to the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, see Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 277, 608 A.2d 840, 845 (1992), we are persuaded that “prosperity” refers to a community’s fiscal well-being, and not to an individual’s financial interest, cf. Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991) (construing general welfare provision of zoning enabling statute as including welfare of the “communi

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 438, 595 A.2d 492, 494 (1991).

In reviewing the reasonableness of a particular zoning provision, we are mindful that zoning is a legislative function, Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991), and “[j]udging the wisdom of the legislation...

44 nonconforming use to continue unless, among other things, it is “[c]hanged to another nonconforming use” or “[ejxtended.” “A municipality’s power to zone property to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the community is delegated to it by the State, and the municipality must, therefore, exercise this power in conformance with the enabling legislation.” Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991).

RSA 674:16, I (1986 & Supp. 1992); Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 441, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991); Sanderson v. Town of Greenland, 122 N.H. 1002, 1005, 453 A.2d 1285, 1287 (1982).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991); State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 595 A.2d 492 (1991); State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

While the trial court does have broad equitable powers to grant relief, see Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 442, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991), the trial court here was not obligated to give REP the relief it sought and could properly deny it.