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Compare Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015) (due process guarantees disclosure of “information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment”), with State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826 (1991) (right to produce all proofs favorable entitles defendant “only to testimony that is both material and favorable to his defense” (emphasis added)); State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 301 (1999) (“To establish a violation of a defendant’s right of confrontat

We construe the defendant’s appellate argument to be that the State’s decision to enter nolle prosequi on the first set of indictments and to re-indict him 28 days later amounted to a fundamentally unfair adjudicatory procedure in violation of his state and federal rights to due process.

Because, under these circumstances, the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution, see State v. White, 163 N.H. 303, 312-13 (2012) (addressing due process); Spaulding, 147 N.H. at 588 (addressing the rights to present all favorable proofs and to confront witnesses); State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826 (1991) (addressing compulsory process), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.

at 160, we distinguished the speedy trial principle set forth in State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818 (1991).

Specifically, relying upon State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818 (1991), she argues that the interruption of proceedings occasioned by the dismissal and refiling of charges does not restart the clock for purposes of the constitutional speedy trial right, and, thus, should not have restarted the clock for purposes of RSA 169-B:14, II.

State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 823 (1991); see also Colombo, 852 F.2d at 23-24; State v. Gaston, 503 A.2d 594 (Conn. 1986).

While this assertion may be true in theory, see Martineau v. Perrin, 119 N.H. 529, 531 (1979), we will follow the First Circuit’s precedent in analyzing this case.

In order to establish a violation of Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution, “a defendant must show that the testimony he was precluded from introducing would have been material and favorable to his defense in ways not merely cumulative of other evidence.” State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826 (1991) (adopting the federal standard for proving a violation of the “compulsory process” clause for purposes of demonstrating a violation of the corresponding rights under Part I, Article 15).

Because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection to the defendant under these circumstances, see State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826, 585 A.2d 853, 857 (1991), we need not conduct a separate federal analysis.

While “specific procedural and factual features of a given case may prompt a claim to discovery on due process grounds,” State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 825, 585 A.2d 853, 856 (1991) (quotation omitted), depositions in criminal cases are ordinarily governed by statute in our State.

In order for the defendant to establish a violation of this right, he “must show that the testimony he was precluded from introducing would have been material and favorable to his defense in ways not merely cumulative of other evidence.” State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826, 585 A.2d 853, 857 (1991).

State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 823, 585 A.2d 853, 855 (1991); see Super.

denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980)); see also State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 824, 585 A.2d 853, 856 (1991).

The right to produce favorable proofs under part I, article 15 does not grant the right to present cumulative testimony, State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826, 585 A.2d 853, 857 (1991), nor does the federal guarantee of due process afford such a right, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, 23 (1967) (right to compulsory process denied when State “arbitrarily denied” right to put on stand witness “vital to the defense”).

While defendant did not waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to assert it, see State v. *604 Dufield, 119 N.H. 28, 30, 398 A.2d 818, 819 (1979), his failure to pursue it actively weakens his contention that it was denied him.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (adopting analysis of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)); Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 1088, 453 A.2d 1304, 1306-07 (1982) (adopting analysis of Gagnon v. Scarpelli and Morrissey v. Brewer); cf. State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 824, 585 A.2d 853, 856 (1991) (unreasonable delay in prosecution violates due process).

State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 823, 585 A.2d 853, 855 (1991); Colbath, 130 N.H. at 319, 540 A.2d at 1213; see Super.

See, e.g., State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, *416 822, 585 A.2d 853, 854-55 (1991) (Hastings inapplicable where the defendant was never arrested or bound over to the grand jury); State v. Moses, 128 N.H. 617, 618-19, 517 A.2d 839, 840 (1986) (Hastings inapplicable where the defendant’s arrest followed his indictment).

However, when a defendant is initially indicted in compliance with Hastings and is subsequently reindicted, we determine the appropriateness of the later indictment in light of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, rather than our court-created right to a speedy indictment.