Cited by

State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 410 (1990) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to bring a motion to sever, in part, because there were strategic reasons for not bringing the motion).

State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405-12 (1990) (reversing denial of defendant’s motion for new trial because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance); cf. State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 767-75 (2009) (discussing merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in motion for new trial); State v. Croft, 145 N.H. 90, 91-95 (2000)

In State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402 (1990), we determined that testimony from a child victim that the defendant “put his finger in my — trying to find my hole,” and that when he found it “he goes around it,” formed an *384 insufficient basis to determine that the defendant digitally penetrated the victim.

We have recognized that “broad discretion is permitted trial counsel in determining trial strategy, and the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s trial strategy was reasonably adopted.” State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 409-10 (1990).

Such a narrow focus did not interfere with the defendant’s ability to establish an alibi defense, see State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 411, 578 A.2d 329, 334 (1990), and thus the concerns underlying Williams are not implicated.

We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that our decisions in O’Neill, 134 N.H. 182, 589 A.2d 999, and State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 578 A.2d 329 (1990), control our analysis.

We have also recognized that “broad discretion is permitted trial counsel in determining trial strategy.” State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 409, 578 A.2d 329, 333 (1990).

When we find that the plaintiff authorized counsel’s concessions of guilt to a lesser-included crime, we still make a separate determination of whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient.

State v. Jones, 133 N.H. 562, 563-64, 578 A.2d 864, 864-65 (1990); State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 407, 412, 578 A.2d 329, 332, 335 (1990); Cox, 133 N.H. at 264-65, 575 A.2d at 1322-23; Howard, 121 N.H. at 55, 61-62, 426 A.2d at 458, 462.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Faragi, 127 N.H. at 5, 498 A.2d at 726.” State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990).

State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

He must show that his trial attorney’s performance was deficient.

Part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees an accused “reasonably competent assistance of counsel,” *158 Matiyosus, 134 N.H. at 687, 597 A.2d at 1069; see State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

The standard for attorney performance under both the State and Federal Constitutions is that of “reasonably effective assistance.” State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)).

The standard for measuring attorney performance, under the right to counsel provisions of both the Federal and State Constitutions, is one of reasonably effective assistance.

A criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably competent assistance of counsel under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution and the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution.

In State v. Fennell, 128 N.H. 383, 513 A.2d 363 (1986), rev’d in part per curiam, 133 N.H. 402, 578 A.2d 329 (1990) (“Fennell I”), the defendant appealed to this court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence concerning one of four charges against him.

The test for determining ineffectiveness requires the defendant to show first that counsel’s performance was deficient, see State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990), and must overcome “the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls *352 within the limits of reasonable practice,” State v. Faragi, 127 N.H. 1, 4-5, 498 A.2d 723, 726 (1985).

Left with the bare testimony of the victim concerning the act of penetration, we can see no difference between the testimony in this case and that in State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 578 A.2d 329 (1990).

The standard for attorney performance, whether the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised under the State or the Federal Constitution, is that of “reasonably effective assistance.” State v. Fennell, 133 N.H. 402, 405, 578 A.2d 329, 331 (1990).

In making his argument, the defendant relies upon State v. Fennell, 128 N.H. 383, 513 A.2d 363 (1986), rev’d in part, 133 N.H. 402, 578 A.2d 329 (1990), asserting in his brief that this court “clearly indicated that it would consider claims on appeal which were not preserved at trial in order to correct ‘manifest error’ or ‘serious injustice.’” See id.