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In "the usual case of adoption," Jessica W., 122 N.H. at 1055, 453 A.2d 1297, the adoptee "receives two new parents, and both of the natural parents, together with their extended families, are substituted out," Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 45, 573 A.2d 128 (1990).

Although Father regained his presumption of fitness once the neglect petitions against him were 9 dismissed, “parental rights are not absolute, but are subordinate to the State’s parens patriae power, and must yield to the welfare of the child.” Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 40 (1990); accord In re Noah W., 148 N.H. 632, 639 (2002).

Under the plain language of the statute, standing to seek visitation does not depend upon “notions of 3 bloodlines or kinship,” and we will not add language to the statute that the legislature did not see fit to include.

We rejected a similar proposition in Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36 (1990).

Although we recognize that parents have a due process right to be heard, to examine witnesses, to be informed of and to challenge all adverse evidence, such rights are not absolute.

This fundamental right is not absolute, but is subordinate to the State’s competing parens patriae power to intervene if a child’s welfare is at stake.

In Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36 (1990), we noted that the State may “intervene in the family milieu if a child’s welfare is at stake----Because the common law presumption against intervention was premised upon the tradition of nuclear family autonomy, State intervention turned, historically, on whether or not the parents were unfit, see [Quilloin, 4

The State, however, does have “a competing interest in the welfare of children within its jurisdiction, and may, as parens patriae, intervene in the family milieu if a child’s welfare is at stake.” Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 40 (1990).

Webb, 133 N.H. at 671 (party-seeking to modify custody has burden of proof); RSA 458:17, V(b) (2004) (same); see Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 42 (1990) (referring to visitation as a custody matter).

This judicial reluctance to interfere with parental prerogatives *548 derives, historically, from the notion that parents have a natural entitlement to the exclusive companionship, care, custody, and management of their children.

We have long recognized the State’s parens patriae interest in the welfare of children within its jurisdiction.

McSherry v. McSherry, 135 N.H. 451, 453, 606 A.2d 311, 313 (1992); Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 46, 573 A.2d 128, 134 (1990).

Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 42, 573 A.2d 128, 132 (1990); Roberts, 126 N.H. at 393, 493 A.2d at 482.

Relying upon Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124 N.H. 138, 467 A.2d 249 (1983), and Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 573 A.2d 128 (1990), the Superior Court (Goode, J.) approved the recommendation of the Master *264 (Peter J. Bourque, Esq.)

“[P]arental rights are not absolute, but are subordinate to the State’s parens patriae power, and must yield to the welfare of the child.” Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 40, 573 A.2d 128, 131 (1990).