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the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, district court lacked authority to grant that remedy regardless of whether it had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case); Matte, 152 N.H. at 223 (rejecting tenant’s argument that district court could properly deny eviction based upon principles of equity because the district court lacks equity jurisdiction); Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991) (upholding superior court’s injunction of district court eviction proceeding

Pike v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 168 N.H. 40, 43-45 (2015) (holding that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge assignment of mortgage on the ground that the assignment did not comply with the PSA); see also Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 817 (1991) (explaining that if an “assignment is effective to pass legal title, [a] debtor cannot interpose defects or objections which merely render [an] assignment voidable at the election of the assignor or those standing in hi

“The superior court is a court of general jurisdiction and has authority to entertain actions in equity where there is no adequate remedy at law.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991); see RSA 498:1 (2010).

but, if the assignment is effective to pass legal title, the debtor cannot interpose defects or objections which merely render the assignment voidable at the election of the assignor or those standing in his shoes.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 817 (1991) (quotation and emphases omitted).

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Kevlik, 161 N.H. 800, 803 (2011); Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991) (holding that superior court properly enjoined landlord from pursuing earlier filed possessory action in district court because although district court had the power to entertain possessory actions under RSA 540:13, it had no equity jurisdiction to address the tenant’s cross-claim for specific performance)

It “is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred by statute.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991); see RSA 502-A:14 (1997).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 816 (1991); see RSA 498:1 (1997).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815 (1991).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815 (1991).

A lease is interpreted to reflect the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815 (1991) (citation omitted).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 817, 585 A.2d 312, 316-17 (1991).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 817, 585 A.2d 312, 317 (1991).

“[T]he proper interpretation of a lease is ultimately a question of law for this court to determine.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815, 585 A.2d 312, 315 (1991).

Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815, 585 A.2d 312, 315 (1991).

We interpret a lease “to reflect the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting.” Woodstock Soapstone Co. v. Carleton, 133 N.H. 809, 815, 585 A.2d 312, 315 (1991).