Cited by

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 512 (1989) (“[A]s long as [certain individuals] can collaterally attack the validity of the ordinance, towns and parties to real estate transactions will have to live with the possibility of supposedly unforeseeable attacks.”).

g no bad faith or intent to delay on the part of the rezoning authority, the time of decision rule, which is followed in a majority of jurisdictions, provides that a reviewing court should analyze an appeal based on the zoning amendment then currently in effect.” McGovern v. City of Manchester, 130 N.H. 628, 631 (1988), disapproved of on other grounds by Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 513 (1989).

Because the legislature presumably understands the well-established constitutional prohibition against applying punitive laws *399 retroactively, cf. Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 512 (1989) (legislature is presumed to know pre-existing law upon which its enactments will operate), the existence of this provision is a strong indication that the legislature did not intend the act to be punitive.

claratory judgment action — even though he has failed to timely file a motion for rehearing — if the action addresses a zoning issue that is “peculiarly suited to judicial rather than administrative treatment and no other adequate remedy is available.” McNamara, 157 N.H. at 74 (quotation omitted); accord Huard v. Town of Pelham, 159 N.H. 567, 573 (2009); Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509 (1989).

at 616 (quotation and brackets omitted) (citing Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509 (1989)).

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509 (1989).

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509, 567 A.2d 188 (1989).

In Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 505-06 (1989), we relied upon Williamson in affirming the dismissal of federal takings and due process claims.

In limited situations, it is unnecessary to “burden local legislative bodies and [zoning boards] with the responsibility for rulings on subjects that are beyond their ordinary competence.” Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509 (1989).

Dec.laratory Judgment Action Under RSA 491:22 PPG's final argument is that the trial court should have allowed its declaratory judgment action, even if it were untimely because PPG filed it outside of the thirty-day appeal period provided in RSA 677:15, I. See Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 567 A.2d 188 (1989); Morgenstern v. Town of Rye, 147 N.H. 558, 561, 794 A.2d 782 (2002).

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502 (1989); Morgenstem v. Town of Rye, 147 N.H. 558, 561 (2002).

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509 (1989).

Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 273 n.11; Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509, 567 A.2d 188, 193 (1989); cf. General Motors Corp., 65 U.S.L.W.

Aparty may appeal an adverse zoning action: (1) by way of statutory appeal, see RSA 677:2 (1986) (current version at RSA 677:2 (Supp. 1994)) and RSA 677:4; (2) by way of declaratory judgment, see Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 503, 504, 567 A.2d 188, 193, 195 (1989); or (3) by way of an equitable proceeding, see Soares v. Atkinson, 129 N.H. 313, 314, 529 A.2d 867, 867 (1987) (underlying action commenced by bill in equity seeking injunctive relief).

The plaintiffs challenged the amendment by seeking a declaratory judgment, see Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509-13, 567 A.2d 188, 193-95 (1989), arguing that the zoning amendment constituted spot zoning.

Although they are not necessarily required to exhaust all available administrative remedies before challenging the ordinance as applied to their property, see Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509, 567 A.2d 188, 193 (1989), the plaintiffs have not even taken the steps necessary to “show that the facts are sufficiently complete, mature, proximate and ripe to place [the plaintiffs] in gear with [their] adversary, and thus to warrant the grant of judicial relief.” Merchants M