Cited by

State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 560 (1989) (concluding reasonable belief that the defendant would likely cause serious bodily injury existed, in part, because the defendant “picked up [the victim] and carried [her] into the bedroom against her will,” then “physically and forcibly thwarted.

State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561 (1989) (“It is the obligation of counsel to request instructions limiting the scope of evidence.”).

State v. *260 Turgeon, 137 N.H. 544, 546, 630 A.2d 276, 277 (1993) (motion to set aside verdict); State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989) (mistrial).

“It was the obligation of the defendant to request curative instructions, and his failure to do so does not justify a reversal of his conviction.” State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 562, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989).

A curable injustice is not grounds for a mistrial regardless of whether the defendant chooses to request an instruction.

Although physical resistance is relevant to a determination of the absence of consent, the absence of physical resistance is not dispositive of the issue.

State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 562, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989); Bruce, 132 N.H. at 470, 566 A.2d at 1148.

Because the court offered to give an instruction to the jury, and the defendant requested none, it did not err in failing to give a curative instruction.

The defendant bears the burden of showing that no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 567 (1989) (citation omitted).

We presume that instructions are followed by the jury.

denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968); see also State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561-62, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989); State v. Bruce, 132 N.H. 465, 470, 566 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1989).

A trial court’s denial of a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989), due to the trial court’s unique ability to gauge the reaction of the jury to any potentially prejudicial information, State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991); Lemire, 130 N.H. at 555, 543 A.2d at 427.

When we review the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 567 (1989), asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We do not intend here to hobble a trial court’s discretion in the ordinary case to choose between giving the jury a curative instruction and simply continuing the trial, see LaBranche, 118 N.H. at 180, 385 A.2d at 110 (curative instruction may “serve[] only to emphasize the prejudice”); nor do we mean to imply that the bell may never be “unrung,” see State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989) (court presumes that curative instructions are followed by jury).

State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989) (jury presumed to follow court’s instructions).

“To justify a mistrial, prejudicial testimony must be more than inadmissible, it ‘must constitute an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.’” State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989) (quoting State v. Lemire, 130 N.H. 552, 555, 543 A.2d 425, 426 (1988)).

In an appeal based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant bears the burden of showing that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial impact of particular testimony, and what steps, if any, are necessary to remedy that prejudice.