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t equate with shifting the burden of proof to the defendant” and that if “the prosecutor’s remarks implied that the defendant held the burden of proof, they constituted a permissible response to the defendant’s closing argument.” We have held that a defendant’s decision not to present evidence in his own defense provides “no basis for an adverse comment by the prosecutor.” State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545 (1989).

The prosecutor’s statement was offered in response to the suggestion by defense counsel that the State neglected to pursue important investigative avenues.

“A defendant’s decision not to testify or present evidence in his own defense can provide no basis for an adverse comment by the prosecutor.” State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545 (1989).

It is equally well-settled that a defendant’s decision not to testify or present evidence in his own defense can provide no basis for an adverse comment by the prosecutor.

“Ordinarily, burden of proof considerations in a criminal trial implicate the due process clause.” State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 544, 567 A.2d 557, 559 (1989).

We need not address the defendant’s State Constitutional claims, since when he objected to the prosecutor’s comments at trial, he did not mention the State Constitution either generally or by citing a specific provision.

Turgeon, 137 N.H. at 547, 630 A.2d at 278; State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 546, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989).

As an initial matter, we agree with the State that the defendant’s failure to raise any State constitutional issue in the trial court renders those claims unpreserved.

State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 559-60 (1989); State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 633, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986).

We presume that jury members follow the instructions provided by the court, State v. Novosel, 120 N.H. 176, 178, 412 A.2d 739, 740 (1980), and we have recognized that appropriate instructions can cure prejudice to the defendant.

The defendant must satisfy two preconditions before triggering a State constitutional analysis: “first, the defendant must raise the State constitutional issue below; second, the defendant’s brief must specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution.” State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989) (quotation omitted).

State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 547, 567 A.2d 557, 561 (1989); State v. Fowler, 110 N.H. 110, 113, 261 A.2d 429, 430 (1970).

Because the defendant has properly preserved his State constitutional claim on appeal, see State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989), we will first address his arguments under the State Constitution, looking to federal case law for guidance.

The defendant has properly preserved both his State and federal claims, see State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989), and we first address the State claim, see id.; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).

Having properly preserved both his State and federal constitutional claims, see State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989), we first consider the defendant’s State claim, looking to federal law not as binding precedent but only for guidance.

Thus, the defendant has properly preserved both his State and federal claims of a due process violation, and we will address his State constitutional argument first.

He has properly preserved his State and federal claims of unconstitutional search and seizure with regard to these arguments.

State v. Fowler, 132 N.H. 540, 545, 567 A.2d 557, 560 (1989); State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986).