Cited by

State v. Bonacorsi, 139 N.H. 28, 31 (1994); State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 527 (1989).

We have held that, “the effect of ‘should’ in the charge provide[s] the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction that even if the jurors found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged, they could still acquit the defendant.” State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 527 (1989) (quotation and brackets omitted).

In State v. Brown, the defendant was on trial for first degree murder, and sought to cross-examine an accomplice who was initially indicted for first degree murder, but later agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter.

State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 526, 567 A.2d 544, 547 (1989); Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).

In making this determination, the trial court must balance the probative value of the proffered testimony against its prejudice, State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 525, 567 A.2d 544, 547 (1989), as well as the likelihood of confusion and delay generated by the evidence.

Such a charge is used to inform the jury of its “historical prerogative” to acquit a defendant even if the verdict is contrary to the law and the facts of the case.

State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 524, 567 A.2d 544, 546 (1990); see State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295, 306 (1985); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).

It is “well established” that the sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to be confronted with the witnesses against them.

One means of impeaching a witness is to show that the witness is biased, and thus would have reason to be untruthful.

Because the defendant failed to object to this instruction at trial, he cannot now complain of error.

State v. Bruce, 132 N.H. 465, 470, 566 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1989) (obligation of counsel to request instructions limiting the scope of evidence); State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 527, 567 A.2d 544, 548 (1989) (counsel must object at trial to jury instructions).

*558 “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); see State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 524, 567 A.2d 544, 546 (1989).

To the extent he argues for a further instruction, ‘“[j]ury nullification is neither a right of the defendant, nor a defense recognized by law.’” State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 520, 527, 567 A.2d 544, 548 (1989) (quoting State v. Mayo, 125 N.H. 200, 203, 480 A.2d 85, 87 (1984)).

We note at the outset that BNE did not raise below its arguments numbered two, three, and five; therefore we do not address those arguments.