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Both the Taxpayers and their attorney are presumed to know the law.

State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”).

15 “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent” (citations om

State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999) (explaining that under the United States Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause “determination of the proper unit of prosecution is a function of the legislature’s intent” (quotation and brackets omitted)); State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989) (noting that “our review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent”).

The statute is drafted in the singular, unambiguously reflecting the legislature’s intent to criminalize each 4 “unprivileged physical contact to another” knowingly caused by a defendant as a separate offense.

We have held that the emphasized language in RSA 159:3 defines the unit of prosecution as each individual firearm possessed by a qualifying felon.

Here, even if we assume that a person’s mistaken understanding of the meaning of a statute could be sufficient to invoke the doctrine of unilateral mistake, but see State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”), the record does not show that the petitioner’s belief that he could convert to a disability retirement allowance after he began receiving a service retirement allowance is consistent with the exercise of ordinary care.

State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (“It is elementary, as well as indispensable to the orderly administration of justice, that every man is presumed to know the laws of the country in which he dwells.” (quotation omitted)).

onspiracy to commit murder), and State v. McKean, 147 N.H. 198, 200-01 (2001) (“double description” case involving kidnapping and criminal threatening charges), with State v. Krueger, 146 N.H. 541, 542-43 (2001) (“unit of prosecution” case involving multiple indictments for aggravated felonious sexual assault of the same victim during the same twenty-five minute encounter), and State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454-55 (1989) (“unit of prosecution” case involving multiple indictments for being a c

“It is elementary, as well as indispensable to the orderly administration of justice, that every man is presumed to know the laws of the country in which he dwells.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (quotation omitted).

State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”).

“However, the failure of the legislature to provide for the specific culpable mental state required for a crime does not mean that the statute is necessarily unenforceable.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989).

To secure a conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the State must prove that: (1) the defendant knowingly owned, possessed or controlled a firearm; and (2) he was previously convicted of a felony.

Generally, “[w]hen the culpable state of mind has been omitted from a statute, the State must prove the existence of the mental state which is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989).

“If the legislature had intended *284 possession, regardless of the number of [visual representations], to be the unit of prosecution, it could have phrased the statute accordingly; e.g., ‘it is unlawful to possess one or more [visual representations of a child engaging in sexual activity].’” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989).

RSA 626:2 (1996) (knowledge of existence of law or whether conduct constitutes offense not element of offense unless law so provides); RSA 626:3, II (1996); State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”).

Although the defendant made reference to vagueness below, he failed to specify which constitutional provisions were allegedly being violated, and he neglected to state whether his claims were founded upon State or federal grounds.

In State v. Stratton, a case with remarkably similar facts, we approved multiple indictments under RSA 159:3.

For example, it is permissible for a defendant to be indicted on six separate counts for the possession of six separate guns because each gun will be used as evidence against him.

The defendant was charged with factually and legally distinct crimes, each dependent upon different evidence.

*647 “Multiple indictments are permissible only if proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quotation and italics omitted).

The elemental evidence required to prove each of the “surprise” indictments, on which the jury acquitted the defendant, is thus different than that required to prove the “force” and the oral penetration indictments, regardless of the evidence the State elected to produce in support of each charge.

Thus, “[m]ultiple indictments are permissible only if proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quotation omitted).

We will not consider constitutional arguments not made in the first instance in the trial court.

Because the defendant did not frame an argument in constitutional terms below, he cannot do so now.

I, art. 16, the legality of a defendant’s indictment for separate crimes stemming from the same incident depends on whether “proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, the supplemental instruction accurately stated the law: ignorance of the law is no excuse.

“The defendant bears the burden of showing that no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 459, 567 A.2d 986, 991 (1989) (citation omitted).

State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 456, 567 A.2d 986, 989 (1989) (“grounds of objection not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be considered for appellate relief”).

When considering the issue of double jeopardy, a subsequent prosecution is permissible only if “‘proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.’” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quoting State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986), itself quoting Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468, 473, 464 A.2d 275, 278 (1983)) (emphasis in original).

When cumulative punishments are sought for offenses arising out of a single transaction, the focus of the inquiry is whether “proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quoting State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986), itself quoting Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468, 473, 464 A.2d 275, 278 (1983)) (emphasis in original).