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[p]hysically injured by other than accidental means.” We have interpreted this provision as requiring proof that “the alleged abusive act was committed under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare.” Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277 (1989).

The abuse petition charged that the child suffered “physical injury” and that her health “suffered or [was] very likely to suffer serious impairment.” We have previously defined the type of evidence that is needed to establish “physical injury.” In Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277 (1989), we held that RSA 169-C:3, 11(d) “require[d] more than proof of two incidents...

In re Melissa M., 127 N.H. 710, 713, 506 A.2d 324, 326 (1986); cf. Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

Indeed, upon reviewing the Hudson Code as a whole, Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989), we conclude that the regulations accord the planning board authority to do just that.

“To resolve the statutory arguments, principles of statutory interpretation require us to look first to the statutory language itself, *690 and to construe the law in a manner consistent with its plain meaning, when possible.” Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276-77, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989) (citation omitted).

We remanded for reconsideration in light of our then-recent decision in Petition of Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 564 A.2d 433 (1989), and the superior court conducted a second hearing on October 5, 1990.

Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276-77, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

However, “[t]o divine the intent of a statute, we will determine its meaning *278 from its construction as a whole, not by examining isolated words and phrases.” Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

Applying the plain meaning of the statute, see Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276-77, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989), the State of Washington and ITTRayonier, Inc. are each a “person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury [the death of Kristian Wells Anderson] for which such payment [from Fidelity to the estate] is made.” RSA 264:15, IV.

Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276-77, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989) (the law is construed consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language).

A. Under RSA 362-C:3 To resolve Hilberg and CRR’s argument that RSA 362-C:3 (Supp. 1990) obligated the PUC to apply traditional ratemaking principles in its analysis of the rates under the rate plan, “principles of statutory interpretation require us to look first to the statutory language itself,” Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989), for the words used in the statute are the best indication of legislative intent.

.” Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989).

Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 276-77, 564 A.2d 433, 438 (1989) (law must be construed in manner consistent with its plain meaning).