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We follow a strong policy against reaching a constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on a nonconstitutional ground, and even when a dispositive statutory issue is not raised by the parties, we may consider it as a way to avoid a needless constitutional decision.

State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 378-80 (1989) (concluding that, although the section heading of a local ordinance discussed prohibitions “generally,” the provision’s text pertained to merchants and the regulation of commercial, rather than political, activity, and therefore did not include the defendant’s political conduct).

“We follow an established policy against reaching a constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on a non- constitutional ground.” Chapman v. Douglas, 146 N.H. 209, 211 (2001); see also State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379 (1989).

State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379 (1989) (We follow strong policy not to address constitutional arguments unless required.).

Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 382-83 (1989).

State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379 (1989); see also Bedford Residents Group v. Town of Bedford, 130 N.H. 632, 638 (1988) (“We will not reach a constitutional issue properly presented where we can rely on a nonconstitutional ground, and base our decision on statutory provisions.” (quotations and citations omitted)).

Appeal of Barry, 141 N.H. 170, 174, *286 681 A.2d 75, 77 (1996); see also State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

In keeping with our long-standing policy not to “decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case,” Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989), we need not address this argument.

Although the petitioners invoke the State and Federal Constitutions to support this claim, we need not reach their constitutional arguments because we decide this issue on nonconstitutional grounds by interpreting section 8.09.

This court has “a strong policy against reaching a constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on a nonconstitutional ground.” State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

Because we affirm the superior court’s finding of a statutory violation, we do not reach the constitutional issues, see State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989), and relate only those facts relevant to the statutory question.

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (1991); State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434, 595 A.2d 492 (1991); State v. Hodgkiss, 132 N.H. 376, 379, 565 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1989).

In keeping with our longstanding policy against reaching a constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on other grounds, however, we do not reach the defendant’s constitutional arguments.