Cited by

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007); State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 528 (1990).

To determine the sufficiency of an officer’s suspicion, we consider the articulable facts in light of all surrounding circumstances, keeping in mind that a trained officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may seem unremarkable to an untrained observer.

Hight, 146 N.H. at 748; see State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 528-29 (1990).

As with other warrantless seizures justified on grounds that do not amount to probable cause, to justify a seizure under the community caretaking exception, the officer must “be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 529 (1990) (quotation and brackets omitted).

We have applied the Terry standard to motor vehicle stops.

State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 530 (1990) (quotation and citation omitted).

We have previously held that under certain circumstances an investigative stop based on less than probable cause may be constitutionally permissible when it is substantially less intrusive than an arrest and based on reasonable suspicion.

On appeal, the defendant initially argues that the dog sniff was an unlawful search in violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, see State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710 (1990), and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

A We need not decide whether the canine sniff on July 18 constituted a search, see State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710 (1990) (plurality opinion), or whether it violated the defendant’s constitutional rights because we conclude that the defendant lacked standing under the State and Federal Constitutions to challenge it.

“[I]n considering what constitutes a search for purposes of our Constitution, we have stated that a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.” State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 533, 580 A.2d 710, 716 (1990) (quotations omitted).

[and the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 529, 580 A.2d 710, 713 (1990) (brackets, quotations and citations omitted).

In our analysis of RSA 570-A:2, we will *730 interpret the phrase “reasonable suspicion” as we do in constitutional cases involving investigative stops..

rests on a balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s [privacy] interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 529, 580 A.2d 710, 714 (1990) (quotation and ellipses omitted).

State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 539, 580 A.2d 710, 720 (1990) (Brock, C.J., concurring specially).

We recently had the opportunity to affirm that certain investigative stops are constitutionally permissible, although based on less than probable cause.