Cited by

State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 127 (1989) (finding no custody when defendant received police transportation for his convenience).

ndstrom, 131 N.H. 203, 207 (1988) (finding that officers responded properly to defendant’s ambiguous statement 8 by explaining that he could request a lawyer to be present at any time and by clarifying his indecision by asking defendant who his lawyer was and whether he wanted to speak with his lawyer at that time or later); see also State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 128 (1989).

Although the officers were “not entirely friendly and sedate,” State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 129 (1989), the interview consisted mainly of questioning in a reasonable tone.

For example, in State v. Carpentier, we found that the defendant was not in custody even though officers used strong language and loud voices when confronting him about discrepancies between his statements and those of other witnesses.

This stands in sharp contrast to State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 127 (1989), where officers provided *774 transportation to the police station for the defendant’s convenience, and State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 696 (1994), where the defendant drove himself to the police station.

Custody entitling a person to Miranda protections during interrogation requires formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest.

In the absence of formal arrest, the trial court must determine whether a suspect’s freedom of movement was sufficiently curtailed by considering how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation.

Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant was in custody when Detective Seusing replaced Agent Johnson and began questioning him, see State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 126-27, 562 A.2d 181, 183 (1989), we hold that the pre-polygraph Miranda warning provided the defendant with sufficient safeguards to protect his right against self-incrimination during the post-polygraph interview.

“Custody determinations for Miranda purposes are essentially factual, and we will uphold the superior court’s rulings unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or the result of an error of law.” State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 126, 562 A.2d 181, 183 (1989) (emphasis added) (implying that custody determinations also involve questions of law).

confessions than does the Federal Constitution, we decide this case under the State Constitution with reference to federal cases only to aid our analysis.” State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 690-91, 645 A.2d 82, 84 (1994) (citation omitted); see, e.g., State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 128, 562 A.2d 181, 184 (1989).

“Custody entitling a person to Miranda protections during interrogation requires formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 126, 562 A.2d 181, 183 (1989) (quotations omitted).

Because the State Constitution provides greater protection to a criminal de *691 fendant with respect to the voluntariness of confessions than does the Federal Constitution, see State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 128, 562 A.2d 181, 184 (1989), we decide this case under the State Constitution with reference to federal cases only to aid our analysis.

We first note that custody determinations “are essentially factual, and we will uphold the superior court’s rulings unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or the result of an error of law.” State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 126, 562 A.2d 181, 183 (1989).