Cited by

Johnston by Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 97 (1990) (finding that the trial court was within its discretion to order plaintiffs to pay the cost of additional depositions).

for “checking or corroborating” the report and there was insufficient physical evidence to support his conclusion that was “largely based upon the statements of an interested [witness]”); cf. Breagy v. Stark, 138 N.H. 479, 484 (1994) (finding that an officer’s opinion testimony concerning the fault or cause of an accident is properly excluded when it would not assist the jury); Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 88 (1990) (same); Saltzman v. Town of Kingston, 124 N.H. 515, 524-25 (1984) (same).

Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 85 (1990); see also State v. Lambert, 147 *791 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Cf Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 90 (1990) (holding that court did not err in declining to give portion of requested instruction that involved comment on the evidence).

New Hampshire law favors liberal discovery.

The trial court’s discretion as to the admission or exclusion of such evidence is wide, and we will not reverse its ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.

In ruling on a motion to set aside a jury verdict, the trial court must decide whether the verdict was reasonable in light of the evidence.

*598 A party is “not entitled to the exact language of [his] requested instruction.” Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 93, 574 A.2d 934, 942 (1990).

Jury instructions serve to identify issues of material fact, and to inform the jury of the appropriate standards of law by which to decide them.

The determination of whether evidence is relevant is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse its determination absent an abuse of that discretion.

The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse the trial court absent a clear abuse of that discretion.

or [in] those situations where the common law of this state has imposed such liability and the Legislature has not seen fit to change it.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972) (quotation omitted) (rejecting tort standard of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity); see also Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 86, 574 A.2d 934, 938 (1990) (rejecting strict liability for collisions between motorists and children); 8 MCNAMARA, supra § 106, at 102.

The defendants, citing Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 574 *484 A.2d 934 (1990), and Saltzman v. Town of Kingston, 124 N.H. 515, 475 A.2d 1 (1984), moved in limine to exclude all opinion testimony-concerning fault or causation, asserting that the jurors were perfectly qualified to analyze the factual evidence and draw their own conclusions.

Nonetheless, the special verdict form did inquire whether “the reports and oral statements prepared and published by the defendant *378 to [SGC’s] Board of Directors referring to the plaintiff caused or were a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries claimed.” The special question, taken with the oral instructions, was adequate and did not mislead the jury.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court.

A trial court is not obligated to use the language requested by a party for jury instructions as long as the instruction given is legally correct and identifies the material factual issues in the case.

The determination of whether particular expert testimony is reliable and admissible rests, in the first instance, within the sound discretion of the trial court.

“The purpose of jury instructions is to identify the factual issues which are material for a resolution of the case, and to inform the jury of the appropriate standards by which they are to decide them.” Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 89, 574 A.2d 934, 940 (1990).

We do not reverse such a decision unless we find that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 89, 574 A.2d 934, 940 (1990); Poulin v. Provost, 114 N.H. 263, 264, 319 A.2d 296, 297 (1974).