Cited by

[the defendant] certainly would be justified in concluding he was not then free to leave, even though the detectives assured him that he was not under arrest.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 223, 224-25 (1989) abrogated on other grounds by Ford, 144 N.H. at 62-63, and State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625 (2003).

E.G., 171 N.H. at 237; State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 225 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Ford, 144 N.H. at 62-63, and State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625 (2003).

tance of the absence or presence of accusatory questioning in our analysis of custody, contrasting accusatory questioning, which weighs in favor of custody, with questioning of a purely general nature, which supports a determination of no custody.” McKenna, 166 N.H. at 682; Jennings, 155 N.H. at 775 (nature of interrogation is important factor in custody determination); see also State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 225 (1989) (finding custody, in part, because intensity of the interview escalated whe

State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226 (1989) (“We will not overturn the superior court’s decision on appeal simply because we might have ruled differently.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 8 62-63 (1999), and State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625 (2003).

“We will not overturn the superior court’s decision on appeal simply because we might have ruled differently.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226 (1989); see In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 600-01 (2011) (explaining that “the fact that the trial court reasonably could have reached a different decision based upon the evidence before it” does not “mean that its decision constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion”).

See, e.g., State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 225 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Ford, 144 N.H. at 62-63 and State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625 (2003).

Thus, we think it implausible “that the defendant could have risen from his seat and freely exited the interview room in the middle of an escalating period of interrogation and gone along on his merry way, especially when the detectives had developed a theory which directly implicated him, and it was their intention to question him further at that point about his involvement.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 223 (1989) (quotation omitted), cert.

Because the defendant has raised his claim under the State and Federal Constitutions, we would normally address his State claim first.

In reviewing a determination of interrogation, we have deferred to the trial court if it applied the appropriate legal standard, and its factual findings were sufficient and not contrary to the manifest weight of the *625 evidence.

Finally, if a defendant has been arrested and is unquestionably in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 224 (1989), cert.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79; State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 224, 564 A.2d 423, 426-27 (1989), cert.

“When officers utter words that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit a suspect’s incriminating response, they engage in the functional equivalent of questioning.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226, 564 A.2d 423, 428 (1989), cert.

This case has been before us previously, State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 564 A.2d 423 (1989), cert.

“When a suspect who is in custody for Miranda purposes requests an attorney, police must cease all questioning and its functional equivalents.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226, 564 A.2d 423, 428 (1989), cert.