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at the trial court erred when it admitted the statements as excited utterances because: (1) the statements were made twenty-four hours after the victim’s death; and (2) during the time between the victim’s murder and the phone call, the grandmother engaged in “complex activities” requiring “relatively careful thought,” which gave her “a chance to consider her own culpability.” See State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 726 (1988).

gather[ ] the two children and the dog,” drive past her friends’ homes, drive to the police station, and then sit in her car for 10 minutes “showed that [she] was not so upset by the incident as to be incapable of considering her options.” Based upon the record before us, however, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that “there was simply too much time for reflective thought.” State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 726 6 (1988); compare id.

State v. McSheehan, 137 N.H. 180, 185 (1993) (finding error not harmless where State’s case rested almost entirely on the credibility of the complaining witness and deposition admitted at trial did more than bolster her credibility); State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 729 (1988) (finding error not harmless when trial court allowed three witnesses to testify to victim’s consistent statements and hearsay testimony was “obviously damaging”).

While the timing of the statement is only one factor to be considered, State v. Pepin, 156 N.H. 269, 274-75 (2007), the admissibility of statements made five days following a startling event runs directly contrary to our prior case law, see State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 726 (1988) (statements made by seven-year-old child a day after an alleged sexual assault allowed “simply too much time for reflective thought”).

Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls within a well delineated exception.

“Hearsay is generally defined as an extrajudicial statement offered in court to show the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 725, 546 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1988); see N.H. R. EV.

Unlike the circumstances present in State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 729, 546 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1988), there was no evidence here that the sole purpose of the examination was to collect evidence.

State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 728, 546 A.2d 1073, 1077 (1988); State v. Koski, 120 N.H. 112, 115, 411 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1980).

To qualify, the utterance must be “a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event, made at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by that event, and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 726, 546 A.2d 1073, 1076 (1988) (quotation omitted).

The trial court’s ruling that the statements did not qualify as excited utterances is not clearly erroneous.

In general, such extrajudicial statements, which are not made under oath or subject to cross-examination, are less trustworthy than those made in court.

In State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 546 A.2d 1073 (1988), the mother of an alleged child sex abuse victim took the seven-year-old child to be examined by a doctor to determine whether the child was “telling the truth” about her encounters with the defendant.

There are three areas of inquiry for a court applying Rule 803(4): the declarant’s intent, see State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 729, 546 A.2d 1073, 1077-78 (1988); the subject matter of the statements; and whether there are circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the statements.

Hearsay is an “extrajudicial statement offered in court to show the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 725, 546 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1988); N.H. R. Ev.