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Our holding today merely reaffirms our long-standing rule that child support awards are to be based upon the obligor’s “present income.” See Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 526 (1988); see also, e.g., Feddersen, 149 N.H. at 196.

In Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 526 (1988), we described “income-averaging” as “takfing] a three-year average of defendant’s *707 income for purposes of determining the amount of support payments.” There, the obligor challenged the trial court’s refusal to use income-averaging.

Courts are free to exercise their sound discretion to establish an appropriate valuation date for the equitable distribution of marital assets.

Parties have the statutory right to seek review of the award three years after its issuance or at any time based upon a substantial change of circumstances.

id.; see also Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 525 (1988).

The court makes the final decision as to what income figures should be used in the calculation based upon the facts presented at the hearing.

We reiterate the rule that trial courts are free to exercise their sound discretion in establishing an appropriate valuation date for the equitable distribution of marital assets.

We have adopted the -view that “the trial court has wide discretion in determining the date on which a value should be placed on marital assets.” Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 523-24 (1988).

at 730; see also Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 525 (1988).

We will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding property settlement or child support absent an abuse of discretion or an error of law.

“ [Tjrial courts are afforded broad discretion in divorce matters,” Magrauth v. Magrauth, 136 N.H. 757, 760, 622 A.2d 837, 838 (1993) (quotation omitted), and we will not overturn the trial court’s rulings regarding property settlement absent an abuse of discretion, see Rothbart v. Rothbart, 141 N.H. 71, 74, 677 A.2d 151, 153 (1996), or error of law.

Keeping in mind that it is generally appropriate for the trial court to set prospective support based on current income figures rather than past earnings or averaged earnings, Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 526, 546 A.2d 1047, 1050-51 (1988), we turn to the facts before the trial court: Turchioe was working full time; he recently began a new company; he was earning substantially more than the average *514 professional in his chosen field; and his income had dropped from more than $120,0

“[I]t is common practice to include business assets as part of the marital estate.” Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 523, 546 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1988).

Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 524, 546 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1988) (discussing, in context of valuation date for marital assets, tendency of real estate to fluctuate in value).

Id.; see Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 525, 546 A.2d 1047, 1050 (1988).

We hold that the superior court was empowered, in the exercise of its broad discretion, see Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 522-23, 546 A.2d 1047, 1048 (1988), to order support for Sarah until her high school graduation if the evidence revealed that she was actively pursuing her diploma and was not emancipated.

This court affords trial courts “broad discretion in divorce matters, and we will uphold their decision unless an abuse of discretion is shown or the court erred as a matter of law.” Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 522-23, 546 A.2d 1047, 1048 (1988).

uphold their decision unless an abuse of discretion is shown or the court erred as a matter of law,” Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 522-23, 546 A.2d 1047, 1048 (1988), we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in this case and, therefore, reverse.

In Hillebrand v. Hillebrand, 130 N.H. 520, 524, 546 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1988), we again addressed the issue of the valuation date for marital assets and allowed for flexibility in establishing the valuation date for most assets.