Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Coppola, 536 A.2d 1236.

19 citing documents.

State v. James Castine N.H. 2019
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 156 (1987) (suggesting that, at some point, evidence can be so unreliable as to be irrelevant).
State v. Amadou Diallo 169 N.H. 355 N.H. 2016
We have previously held that the failure of a prosecutor to specify, in the pretrial notice, the grounds supporting a request for an extended sentence “will not render the statute inapplicable in the absence of actual prejudice.” State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 155 (1987) (decided under earlier version of statute).
State v. Russo 62 A.3d 798 N.H. 2013
ifying prior convictions” and to ensure “that the defendant be fully notified, before making decisions about whether to plead guilty or go to trial, of the possible consequences of his actions.” We have previously said that the objective to be served by the pretrial notice is to “give the defendant an opportunity to offer evidence to refute the findings required by the statute.” State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 155 (1987) (quotation and ellipsis omitted) (decided under former statute).
State v. Neeper 160 N.H. 11 N.H. 2010
In Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18, the United States Supreme Court “held that the requirement of fundamental fairness inherent in the due process guarantee bars the State from impeaching a defendant with evidence that he remained silent after arrest and Miranda warnings.” State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 150-51 (1987), cert.
State v. Tucker 765 A.2d 1058 N.H. 2001
The State argues that the offer of a bribe was an independent crime not subject to the protection afforded by Miranda, see United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1984), and that even if the trial court’s Miranda analysis was incorrect, we should affirm the court’s ruling, see State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987) (affirming based on alternative grounds for admission of statement), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Scovill 743 A.2d 303 N.H. 1999
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987), remanded for new trial on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Anderson 714 A.2d 227 N.H. 1998
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987) (no error where admissible hearsay admitted under wrong exception to hearsay rule).
State v. Lesnick 677 A.2d 686 N.H. 1996
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 154, 536 A.2d 1236, 1240 (1987), remanded for new trial on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Kimball 663 A.2d 634 N.H. 1995
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 156, 536 A.2d 1236, 1241 (1987), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Coppola v. Powell, 818 F.2d 1562 (1st.
Simpkins v. Snow 661 A.2d 772 N.H. 1995
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1240 (1987), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Cole 652 A.2d 1204 N.H. 1994
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1240 (1987), remanded for new trial on other grounds sub nom.
State v. MacArthur 644 A.2d 68 N.H. 1994
We need not decide whether the State can raise on appeal alternative grounds for admission that were either not presented to or not considered by the trial court, compare State v. McLaughlin, 135 N.H. 669, 672, 610 A.2d 809, 810-11 (1992) and State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09, 586 A.2d 77, 83-84 (1991) with State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987) and State v. Goulet, 129 N.H. 348, 351, 529 A.2d 879, 881 (1987), because even assuming all this evidence was properly
State v. Tufts 618 A.2d 818 N.H. 1992
Our concern is that sentencing courts should not consider conclusory statements of criminal conduct lacking a factual basis, i.e., “evidence [that] does not carry suspicion to the point of probability,” State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 156, 536 A.2d 1236, 1241 (1987), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Hurlburt 603 A.2d 493 N.H. 1991
State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 155, 536 A.2d 1236, 1240 (1987) (the objective to be served by pretrial notice is to give the defendant an opportunity to offer evidence to refute the applicability of RSA 651:6), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
State v. Reid 594 A.2d 160 N.H. 1991
In State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 536 A.2d 1236 (1987), remanded for new trial on other grounds, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir.), cert.
State v. Favreau 592 A.2d 1136 N.H. 1991
The State relies on State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 536 A.2d 1236 (1987), remanded for new trial on other grounds, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir.), cert.
State v. Wisowaty 580 A.2d 1079 N.H. 1990
In State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 536 A.2d 1236 (1987), rev’d on other grounds, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir.), cert.
Stewart v. Cunningham 550 A.2d 96 N.H. 1988
State v. Toto, 123 N.H. 619, 465 A.2d 894 (1983); State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 536 A.2d 1236 (1987).
State v. Woods 546 A.2d 1073 N.H. 1988
Compare State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 154, 536 A.2d 1236, 1240 (1987) (declarant upset, excited and hysterical, and “raving”), State v. Bonalumi, supra at 488, 503 A.2d at 788 (declarant “upset and speaking spontaneously and probably angrily”) and State v. Kenna, 117 N.H. at 308, 374 A.2d at 430 (declarant “very excited”) with State v. Shannon, 125 N.H