Cited by

Bowling, 900 F.2d at 933; cf. State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 484 (1988) (“If, when the disputed portions are stricken from the search warrant application, enough information remains to support a finding of probable cause, then the warrant will be upheld.”).

RSA 359-C:ll, II explains the circumstances under which law enforcement or the county attorney may obtain a customer’s otherwise confidential financial information when a criminal or civil investigation is pending without legal process or the customer’s authorization.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and apply the rules of logical relevance.

We have previously held that the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Privacy Act is an appropriate remedy to vindicate the purpose behind the legislature’s passage of the act.

State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 493 (1988) (no abuse of discretion where, among other things, trial court considered defendant’s age, health needs, and lack of prior criminal involvement in determining sentence).

In New Hampshire, the moving party has the burden of presenting a sufficient record to allow proper review by this Court.

Thus, to test the validity of a search warrant issued on an affidavit referencing illegally seized evidence, the reviewing court excises the tainted information and examines the remaining information to determine whether it establishes probable cause.

State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 493 (1988) (quotations, citations and brackets omitted).

State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 493, 547 A.2d 672, 682 (1988) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).

As a general rule, “[t]he exact date of [an] assault is not an element of aggravated felonious sexual assault,” State v. Demond, 136 N.H. 233, 234, 614 A.2d 1342, 1342-43 (1992) (quotation omitted), and the State is not required to prove that an assault occurred at the time alleged in the indictment, see State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 489, 547 A.2d 672, 680 (1988).

Consequently, we decline to consider this issue on appeal.

Whether or not to compel a prosecution witness to undergo a psychiatric examination is within the trial court’s discretion.

A trial court has broad discretion “in choosing the sources and types of evidence on which to rely in imposing sentence,” State v. Tufts, 136 N.H. 517, 519, 618 A.2d 818, 819 (1992) (quotation omitted), and its sentencing decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion, State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 493, 547 A.2d 672, 682 (1988).

See, e.g., State v. Bergmann, 135 N.H. 97, 599 A.2d 502 (1991); State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 491, 547 A.2d 672, 681 (1988); State v. Winders, 127 N.H. 471, 477, 503 A.2d 798, 802 (1985); see also Sup.

State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 491, 547 A.2d 672, 681 (1988) (citing State v. Winders, 127 N.H. 471, 477, 503 A.2d 798, 802 (1985)); Sup.

We do not reach the defendant’s federal constitutional claim, however, as it was not raised at trial and has, therefore, not been preserved for appeal.

State v. Johnson, 130 N.H. 578, 587, 547 A.2d 213, 218 (1988) (legal sufficiency of charge not properly preserved for appeal because defendant failed to object at trial); State v. Stearns, 130 *447 N.H. 475, 486, 547 A.2d 672, 678 (1988) (defendant’s contention that police misrepresented statements in affidavit not raised before trial court and therefore not preserved for appeal).

Regardless of the strength of the plaintiff’s arguments, a trial judge is granted broad discretion when balancing the probative value of evidence against the possible prejudice resulting from its admission.

In State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 493, 547 A.2d 672, 686 (1988), we applied the abuse of discretion standard to review an initial sentencing determination.

In passing on the warrant’s challenged validity, the trial court therefore excised the references to the fruits of the car search, see Franks v. Delaware, 438 *213 U.S. 154, 155-56, 171-72 (1978); State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 484, 547 A.2d 672, 677 (1988); we do the same.)

The record before us reveals that defendant failed to bring to the trial court’s attention his claim of error in regard to sentencing under the enhanced sentence statute, RSA 651:6,1(a), specifically denial of due process and insufficient proof; therefore, we need not consider it on appeal.

As we stated in State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 486, 547 A.2d 672, 678 (1988), those issues that were not raised below are not subject to review on appeal.

Mr. Moses: Thank you.” Defendant did not contest the superior court’s characterization at this time, nor at any other time during the hearing and therefore cannot do so on appeal.

an indictment to be deemed constitutionally sufficient, it must “inform the defendant of the offense for which he is charged with sufficient specificity so that he knows what he must be prepared to meet and so that he is protected from being put in jeopardy once again for the same offense.” State v. Inselburg, 114 N.H. 824, 827, 330 A.2d 457, 459 (1974) (citations omitted); see State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 488, 547 A.2d 672, 679 (1988) (citations omitted); State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 770