Cited by

State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319 (1988) (“[R]eaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.”).

As we have stated, “relief for a Brady violation requires proof that the violation somehow caused [the defendant] prejudice.” State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 320-21 (1988).

When the reason for the delay is the vicissitudes of scheduling, the delay does not weigh heavily against the State.

e defendant’s argument that the trial court was justified in dismissing the charges after finding that the materials submitted by the State for in camera review “may be exculpatory and would have had to be disclosed to the defendant in accordance with Brady v. Maryland.” In order to qualify for relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the defendant was required to demonstrate prejudice.

The trial court concluded that the length of the delay in this case was sufficient to justify review under the remaining Barker criteria.

Therefore, we do not address the argument here.

*415 We apply a four-part test first enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), for determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial right under part I, article 14 of the State Constitution has been violated.

State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 320-21, 540 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1988) (noting that the “State would be well advised to remind its police investigators of the rule in Brady”).

Because the Federal Constitution does not afford the defendant greater protection in the present case, see State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988), we need not undertake a separate federal analysis, see Ball, 124 N.H. at 232, 471 A.2d at 351.

A delay of this length is presumptively prejudicial and warrants an examination of the remaining three factors.

State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988) (court utilizes same test under State Constitution as that enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)).

by the State.” In determining whether the approximately twenty-five-month delay between indictment and trial in this case violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights under either part I, article 14 of the State Constitution or the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution, we apply the four-factor analysis adopted in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988).

In ruling upon the defendant’s speedy trial claim, the threshold inquiry is the determination of the actual time to be considered in assessing the period of delay.

To determine whether a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial would have been successful had it been filed by the petitioner’s trial counsel, we analyze the petitioner’s speedy trial claim by applying the four-factor balancing test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).

He was found guilty, but in an earlier appeal to this court the conviction was reversed because of trial court error in refusing to admit certain evidence.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972); State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988); State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 831, 395 A.2d 189, 190 (1978).