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The defendant argues that the Superior Court (MacLeod, J.) erred by: (1) allowing 2 the State to introduce evidence of his voting history; (2) precluding him from introducing evidence pertaining to an alleged third-party perpetrator; and (3) denying his motion for a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669 (1987).

The defendant argues that the four questions his counsel asked the witness to answer at the Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669 (1987), did not have a tendency to subject her to prosecution because of their limited scope.

Lawrence’s penal interest.2 The trial court granted the State’s motion, ruling that the statements were inadmissible hearsay.3 2 Before trial, the court conducted a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669 (1987), regarding St.

Based on this information, he filed motions for a new trial, for a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 673-74 (1987), and to pierce the attorney-client privilege.

At a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 673-74 (1987), Poulin asserted his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and refused to answer any questions about the trip to Concord.

*56 Javier, one of Anderson’s girlfriends, also testified that a few days before the incident, Anderson had told her “he had a job to do and that [the defendant] was going to take care of him and he was going to pay him good and [there] was going to be a little time, jail time.” Before trial, Burnett and Thorpe both asserted their privilege against self-incrimination at separate Richards hearings.

In his prayers for relief, the defendant asked the trial court to “[e]xclude the computer communication and/or chat” or, in the alternative, “[h]old a Richards hearing and/or allow the defense to introduce evidence of the misdemeanors committed by the investigators.” See State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669 (1987).

The court scheduled a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669 (1987), “to determine whether the witness’ testimony would violate his right not to testify against himself.” Prior to the hearing, however, the Hillsborough County Attorney granted Spencer immunity from prosecution.

In State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 671-73 (1987), the trial court refused to allow a defendant to ask any questions of a witness who exerted an unlimited privilege against self-incrimination.

State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 531 A.2d 338 (1987) (failure to investigate validity of sole defense witness’s Fifth- Amendment claim of privilege violated defendant’s right to fair trial under State Constitution).

While it is unclear whether he would have asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and what result a Richards hearing would have produced, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 531 A.2d 338 (1987), counsel still had to weigh these risks against the apparent benefit to be secured from Ellis’ testimony.

At a pretrial hearing relative to their right to invoke their privileges against self-incrimination, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 531 A.2d 338 (1987), both men asserted the privilege on several occasions during direct examination.

*410 At trial, the defendant sought to call DeCormier as a witness, but DeCormier successfully asserted his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 673, 531 A.2d 338, 341 (1987), and the court ruled that he would be considered an unavailable witness.

804(b)(3) reporter’s notes; see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 674, 531 A.2d 338, 341-42 (1987).

Cook, supra at 662, 610 A.2d at 805 (citing State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 674, 531 A.2d 338, 341-42 (1987), and State v. Mallar, 127 N.H. 816, 818, 508 A.2d 1070, 1071 (1986)).

State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 674, 531 A.2d 338, 341-42 (1987); State v. Mallar, 127 N.H. 816, 818, 508 A.2d 1070, 1071 (1986).

State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 674, 531 A.2d 338, 341-42 (1987); State v. Mallar, 127 N.H. 816, 819, 508 A.2d 1070, 1071 (1986).

The defendant filed pretrial motions (1) to suppress evidence of hair samples found at the scene of the crime and (2) to suppress the defendant’s prior testimony at a so-called Richards hearing held during the trial of Anthony Barnaby, see State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 531 A.2d 338 (1987).

Therefore, to the extent that the defendant relies on our holdings in State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 210-11, 400 A.2d 480, 482 (1979) and State v. Richards, 129 N.H. 669, 531 A.2d 338 (1987), that reliance is misplaced.