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Moreover, injunctive relief “is one of the peculiar and extraordinary powers of equity normally to be exercised only when warranted by imminent danger of great and irreparable harm.” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted).

Our deference to the trial court’s ruling in this case is heightened by the fact that the evidence included a view of 5 the plaintiff’s lot.

Injunctive relief is one of the peculiar and extraordinary powers of equity, to be exercised only when warranted by imminent danger of great and irreparable damage.

The court concluded that “[i]mposing a remedy after construction that costs from $1.1 million to $1.3 million and diminishes the usefulness of the building, as compared to the aesthetic benefits that would be achieved, would not be just.” See N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 781 (1987) (The decision whether to enjoin a violation of restrictive covenants requires a “balancing of harms.”).

In determining whether the doctrine should apply to bar a suit, a court should consider “the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the conduct of the defendants, the interests to be vindicated, and the resulting prejudice.” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774,785 (1987).

*24 [2] “[I]t is the historie purpose of equity to secure complete justice----” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 783 (1987) (quotation omitted).

“The trial court has broad and flexible equitable powers which allow it to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300 (1982) (quotation omitted); see also N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 783 (1987) (it is historic purpose of equity to secure complete justice and courts may adjust remedies to grant necessary relief).

an equitable right has been demonstrated, the court is bound to grant every kind of remedy necessary to its complete establishment, protection, and enforcement according to its essential nature.” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774,783 (1987) (quotation omitted).

In determining whether the doctrine should apply to bar a suit, the court should consider “the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the conduct of the defendants, the interests to be vindicated, and the resulting prejudice.” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 785, 533 A.2d 351, 357 (1987) (quotation omitted).

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact “if it is supported by the evidence, particularly when the trier of fact has bolstered his conclusions with a view.” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779, 533 A.2d 351, 353 (1987).

state of Younge v. Huysmans, 127 N.H. 461, 466, 506 A.2d 282, 285 (1985) (quoting North Bay Council, Inc. v. Grinnell, 123 N.H. 321, 325, 461 A.2d 114, 116 (1983)), and the decision of the trial court will not be overruled unless unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, Moore v. Conifer Corp., 130 N.H. 795, 798, 547 A.2d 298, 300 (1988); see N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779, 533 A.2d 351, 353 (1987) (stating that the trial court’s decision will not be overtu

*284 We do not find the trial court’s consideration of Mr. Musumeci’s mistake to be an abuse of its broad equitable powers.

The master’s findings are supported by the evidence when the record discloses “evidence from which a reasonable person could have made such findings,” Town of Plaistow v. Nadeau, 126 N.H. 439, 442, 493 A.2d 1158, 1161 (1985); and, as long as the decision is supported by the evidence, “[t]his court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact,” N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779, 533 A.2d 351, 353 (1987).

N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 779, 533 A.2d 351, 353 (1987) (citing Heston v. Ouster, 119 N.H. 58, 60, 398 A.2d 536, 537 (1979)).