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A complaint or indictment is constitutionally sufficient if it informs a defendant of the charge with enough specificity to allow the defendant to prepare for trial and be protected against double jeopardy.

State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 770 (1987) (“[A] defendant charged with a specific offense may effectively invoke double jeopardy protection [and] educate his counsel on whatever he knows about the offense, so that investigation, discovery and other trial preparation can begin.”).

Still, while acknowledging that an accomplice may be convicted on the basis of acts not specifically alleged in an indictment, see State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 769 (1987), the defendant contends that the removal of the window screen was the only act that “could be a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of burglary.” The defendant’s argument conflates the law of attempt with the law of accomplice liability.

We conclude that the indictments “inform[ed] the defendant of the offense for which he is charged with sufficient specificity so that he knows what he must be prepared to meet” at trial.

We held in State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 769 (1987), that an accomplice may be convicted on the basis of overt acts not specifically alleged in an indictment.

In order to satisfy Part I, Article 15, an indictment must describe the offense with sufficient specificity to ensure that the defendant can prepare for trial and avoid double jeopardy.

While the State is required to plead all the elements of an alleged crime in an information, see State v. LeClair, 126 N.H. 479, 480, 493 A.2d 498, 499 (1985), it is not obligated to plead facts beyond those necessary to identify the specific offense charged, see State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 770, 533 A.2d 346, 349 (1987).

ased in the back of the head causing his death.” Beginning with the defendant’s challenges to the indictment, we first conclude that the indictment both alleged all of the elements of the crime of negligent homicide and informed the defendant of the offense for which he was charged with sufficient specificity that he could prepare for trial and be protected against being placed in double jeopardy.

In State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 533 A.2d 346 (1987), this court, in considering whether an alleged accomplice could be convicted on proof of an overt act not identified in the indictment, discussed the constitutional requirement of specificity.

State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 769, 533 A.2d 346, 348 (1987) (accomplice may be convicted on proof of acts not specified in indictment).

An indictment provides such protection if it “‘allege[s] all thé elements of an offense that is identified by pleaded facts.’” State v. Pelky, 131 N.H. 715, 719, 559 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1989) (quoting State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 770, 533 A.2d 346, 349 (1987)).

Indeed, the specification of the owner was necessary solely to identify the offense with particularity.

of the offense for which he is charged with sufficient specificity so that he knows what he must be prepared to meet and so that he is protected from being put in jeopardy once again for the same offense.” State v. Inselburg, 114 N.H. 824, 827, 330 A.2d 457, 459 (1974) (citations omitted); see State v. Stearns, 130 N.H. 475, 488, 547 A.2d 672, 679 (1988) (citations omitted); State v. Therrien, 129 N.H. 765, 770, 533 A.2d 346, 348 (1987).