Cited by

During oral argument, the defendant raised, for the first time, an argument that vehicles were not contemplated by the legislature to be regarded as deadly weapons under RSA 625:11, V. Because this argument was not briefed to this court, or argued before the trial court, we decline to address it.

Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 428 (1987) (“Arguments not briefed are waived on appeal.”).

Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 428 (1987) (“Arguments not briefed are waived on appeal.”).

Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 428 (1987) (“Arguments not briefed are waived on appeal.”).

v. Hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft, 163 N.H. 46, 50 (2011); see Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 425 (1987) (recognizing collateral estoppel and issue preclusion as the same doctrine).

It “refers to all theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction in question.” Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 426 (1987) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Compare Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 428 (1987) (“prior criminal conviction has collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil proceeding as to the issues actually litigated and decided in the criminal case” (emphasis added)).

It “refers to all theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction in question.” Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 426 (1987) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Although the defendant in Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422,428 (1987), argued that collateral estoppel should not apply to her prior conviction because she did not testify at her criminal trial, we did not address the argument because she failed to preserve it.

We have recognized it as “long-settled that a prior divorce decree acts as a bar to a subsequent action for divorce, as to the same ground and every issue actually litigated.” Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 425-26 (1987).

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000); Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 430 (1987).

Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 431 (1987) (reaffirming the established principle that New Hampshire does not permit recovery of punitive damages in personal injury cases).

We will therefore address both collateral estoppel and res judicata.

*82 V. Remaining Counts We need not address the dismissal of the claims asserted in counts III, VIII, and IX because the plaintiffs offer no legal argument in their brief concerning these counts and thus have waived their appeal as to them.

Henderson’s Case, 141 N.H. 805, 806, 694 A.2d 973, 974 (1997) (clear and convincing standard applied in discipline matter); Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 427-28, 529 A.2d 909, 912-13 (1987) (successful criminal prosecution can bar defendant from relitigating liability and causation in subsequent civil action because of higher burden of proof in prior action); see also Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 647 N.E.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Mass. 1995).

Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 428, 529 A.2d 909, 913 (1987) (“Arguments not briefed are waived on appeal.”).

It was the plaintiff’s position that under Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909 (1987) she was entitled to a directed verdict as to whether Mr. Brown had assaulted her.

Thus, we need not consider the issue on appeal.

This case was argued before us along with the case of Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909 (1987), the underlying civil action based upon substantially the same facts.