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Although we have previously noted that “it is conceivable that a pattern of nonenforcement would be so systematic as to constitute ratification of a policy of nonenforcement,” Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987), we have declined to extend this dicta, see Hansel v. City of Keene, 138 N.H. 99, 103 (1993).

Instead, he argues that the trial court erred by ruling that (1) the town was not estopped, pursuant to the so-called doctrine of systematic nonenforcement, see Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987) (observing, in dicta, that “it is conceivable that a pattern of nonenforcement would be so systematic as to constitute ratification of a policy of nonenforcement”), from enforcing its zoning ordinance so as to prohibit him from operating his “hired hauler” trucking business from hi

however, that “‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required.’” Montenegro, 166 N.H. at 222 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)); see also State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 297 (1986) (observing that a law is not unconstitutionally vague “merely because it could have been drafted with greater precision” (quotation omitted)); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 281 (1987) (“An ordinance is not necessarily vague because it does not precisely appris

State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 325 (2004) (quotation omitted); see Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499 (2007); Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 473-74 (2004); Pope v. Little Boar’s Head Dist., 145 N.H. 531, 535 (2000); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987); State v. Monahan, 125 N.H. 17, 26 (1984); State v. Pinsince, 105 N.H. 38, 41 (1963).

hat it was possible to avoid a citation for overnight parking by obtaining permission of the local police and that “generally only local residents are aware of these exemptions.” The defendant does not argue, nor does the record contain evidence, that the purported “selective enforcement of the ordinance against him was a conscious intentional discrimination,” *326 Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987) (quotations omitted); nor does he assert that the city “impermissibly estab

Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987).

Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987).

Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987).

Konover relies primarily on our decision in Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 525 A.2d 276 (1987), for the proposition that “a pattern of nonenforcement...

Devaney v. Town of Windham, 132 N.H. 302, 564 A.2d 454 (1989); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 525 A.2d 276 (1987) (estoppel asserted both offensively against denial of variance and defensively against Town’s petition for injunction).

“We will not overturn the trial court’s findings ‘unless they are unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’” Devaney v. Town of Windham, 132 N.H. 302, 306, 564 A.2d 454, 456 (1989) (quoting Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 284, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987) (citations omitted)).

Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 284, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987).

We will not overturn the trial court’s findings “unless they are unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 284, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987) (citing Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 125 N.H. 745, 748, 485 A.2d 287, 289 (1984)).

Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 281, 525 A.2d 276, 278 (1987); Town of Nottingham v. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 892, 424 A.2d 1125, 1127 (1980).

for a variance are: “(1) no diminution in value of surrounding properties would be suffered; (2) granting the permit would be of benefit to the public interest; (3) denial of the permit would result in unnecessary hardship to the owner seeking it; (4) granting the permit would do substantial justice; (5) the use must not be contrary to the spirit of the ordinance.” Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 284, 525 A.2d 276, 280 (1987).

in unnecessary hardship to the owner seeking it; (4) granting the permit would do substantial *760 justice; (5) the use must not be contrary to the spirit of the ordinance.” U-Haul Co. of N.H. & Vt., Inc. v. City of Concord, 122 N.H. 910, 912, 451 A.2d 1315, 1317 (1982) (quoting Moore v. City of Rochester, 121 N.H. 100, 101, 427 A.2d 10, 11 (1981)); see also Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 525 A.2d 276 (1987).