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“[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 364 (1987) (quotation omitted).

He argues that, pursuant to State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358 (1987), the trial court is not permitted to rely upon such conduct.

State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 364 (1987); see N.H. Const. pt.

Not all interactions between the police and citizens involve a seizure of the person.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sever after reviewing the factors identified in State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367-68 (1987), and State v. Fecteau, 133 N.H. 860, 869 (1991).

Traditionally, we have liberally permitted joinder of criminal offenses for trial, asking only “whether the evidence in support of each offense was brief, simple and unlikely to confuse a jury, and easily referable to each crime.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367 (1987); see State v. Fecteau, 133 N.H. 860, 869 (1991).

“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 364 (1987) (quotation omitted).

The reasonable person standard is simply the hallmark of an objective inquiry and is used in contexts ranging from the establishment of probable cause, see, e.g., State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 235 (1983), the determination of whether a person is seized for constitutional purposes, see, e.g., State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 364-65 (1987), contract interpretation, see, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut.

“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 364, 530 A.2d 775, 778 (1987) (quotation omitted).

It is an abuse of discretion to consider offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted or prior convictions which have been found constitutionally infirm.

ew trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the moving party must establish: “(1) that the moving party was not at fault for not discovering the evidence at the former trial; (2) that the evidence is admissible, material to the merits,'and not cumulative; and (3) that [the evidence is] of such a character that a different result will probably be reached upon another trial.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 370, 530 A.2d 775, 781-82 (1987) (quotations and ellipses omitted).

Judges are “to ignore unsubstantiated, unverified statements made in the probation report.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 372, 530 A.2d 775, 783 (1987).

In reviewing the trial court’s determination, “we must ask whether the evidence in support of each offense was brief, simple and unlikely to confuse a jury, and easily referable to each crime.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367, 530 A.2d 775, 780 (1987).

Relying upon State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 530 A.2d 775 (1987), the defendant asks that we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.

(1941) (absent changed circumstances, reconsideration is optional, not mandatory); compare Cagan’s Inc. v. N.H. Dept. of Rev. Admin., 128 N.H. 180, 184-85, 512 A.2d 411, 414 (1986) (trial court abused discretion by denying plaintiffs’ request to further develop record when litigation was “extraordinarily complex” and plaintiffs previously were unaware that issue would arise) with State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 370, 530 A.2d 775, 781-82 (1987) (trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defend

A trial court abuses its discretion by relying on charges that have been resolved by acquittals.

.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 370, 530 A.2d 775, 781 (1987) (quotation omitted).

Her credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony are clearly matters within the jury’s purview.

He relies on our direction to sentencing courts in State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 372, 530 A.2d 775, 783 (1987), “to ignore unsubstantiated, unverified statements made in the probation report.” Presentence reports prepared in contemplation of sentencing may refer to criminal charges not resulting in conviction and may be based on hearsay.

The obligation to determine the credibility of witnesses belongs to the jury.

Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly considered the “loan book” in rendering a sentence on the conviction for possession because the “loan book” was admitted at trial only as evidence of intent to distribute, the charge of which the defendant was acquitted.

In making this determination, “we must ask whether the evidence in support of each offense was brief, simple and unlikely to confuse a jury, and easily referable to each crime.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367, 530 A.2d 775, 780 (1987).

Hence, a defendant is not invariably entitled to a nullification instruction.

To determine whether the court has abused its discretion, we must “ask whether the evidence in support of each offense was brief, simple and unlikely to confuse a jury, and easily referable to each crime.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367, 530 A.2d 775, 780 (1987); accord II ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Justice, Joinder and Severance, Standard 13-3.1(e) (2d ed. 1980).

Accordingly, we will defer to the jury’s findings “unless no reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusion after weighing the conflicting evidence.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 369-70, 530 A.2d 775, 781 (1987).

Accordingly, a defendant is not entitled to a jury nullification instruction.

in the absence of a showing of an abuse of this discretion, its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.” State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 367, 530 A.2d 775, 779-80 (1987) (permitting consolidation of a felony and seven misdemeanor sexual assault charges for offenses occurring on two separate days in two different towns).

Although the defendant argues that the issue is governed by State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 375, 530 A.2d 775, 785 (1987), in which we held that a sentencing court could not find a pattern of criminal conduct based on acquittals, we believe that Cote is inapposite to the instant case, which is controlled by considerations of relevance.

State v. Whitney, 125 N.H. 636, 639, 484 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1984); State v. Lainey, 117 N.H. 592, 595, 375 A.2d 1162, 1164 (1977).

[I]f you find that the State has proven all of the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.” *676 In State v. Cote, 129 N.H. 358, 368, 530 A.2d 775, 780 (1987), we rejected the argument that the trial judge must instruct the jury that it has the power of nullification.