Cited by

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46 (1987).

ents of conversion); (5) the plaintiff did not allege any facts, beyond bald assertions of “collusion” and “acting in concert,” establishing an agreement to commit a tort so as to state a claim for civil conspiracy, and any claim that the defendants conspired to violate § 1983 was precluded by the federal court’s dismissal of his conspiracy to violate § 1983 claim, see Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47 (1987) (stating elements of civil conspiracy); see also Stevens v. Rowe, 59 N.H. 578

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46-47 (1987) (ruling that “to withstand a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must specify the essential details of the fraud, and specifically allege the facts of the defendant’s fraudulent actions” and that “[i]t is not sufficient for the plaintiff merely to allege fraud in general terms” (quotations omitted)).

“The denial of a motion to dismiss is proper if the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 212 (1996) (quotation omitted); see Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44 (1987) (court must determine whether the facts as pled are sufficient under the law to constitute a cause of action).

“In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must specify the essential details of the fraud, and specifically allege the facts of the defendant’s fraudulent actions.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46-47 (1987) (brackets and quotation omitted).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47 (1987) (outlining elements of civil conspiracy).

The only anti-trust injury the plaintiffs allege is that the defendants’ alleged anti-competitive behavior has caused them to pay “unjustified, exorbitant and unreasonable charges for telephone calls received from prisoners.” Cf. Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47 (1987) (to prevail on private anti-trust action alleging conspiracy, plaintiff must prove damages).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45 (1987).

It is not sufficient for the plaintiff merely to allege fraud in general terms.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46-47 (1987) (ellipsis, brackets, citation and quotation omitted).

e law, the elements of a civil conspiracy are: “(1) two or more persons...; (2) an object to be accomplished (ie., an unlawful object to be achieved by lawful or unlawful means or a lawful object to be achieved by unlawful means); (3) an agreement, on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47 (1987).

What is involved is a pre-trial, threshold inquiry that tests the facts in the complaint *598 against the applicable law.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44-45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46-47, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (1987).

To establish liability for this tort, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of this relationship; *374 (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (1987) (quotation omitted).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Although factual allegations are assumed to be true, a “court need not accept statements in the complaint which are merely conclusions of law.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987) (quotations omitted).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Because the plaintiff’s amendment incorporates the facts of the initial complaint and alleges only conclusions of law, see Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987), and because the proposed amendment would not cure the defect in the writ, see LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 568, 594 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1991), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend.

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (1987).

The issue thus becomes “whether the facts as pled are sufficient under the law to constitute a cause of action.” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 45, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44, 534 A.2d 706, 708 (1987).