Cited by

Accordingly, I conclude that this record does not provide an objective basis sufficient to support a finding that justice requires a ten-year adjustment over and above the length of the maximum guideline alimony award.2 Cf. Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162-63 (1987) (finding that spouse suffering from progressive debilitating illness with “little hope for an independent lifestyle” justified request for extension of alimony); In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 39-40 (2002) (findi

Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161 (1987) (quotation omitted); see Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195 (1967).

RSA 458:19 (Supp. 2016); Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162 (1987) (holding rehabilitative principle of alimony not controlling when supported spouse suffers from ill health and is not capable of earning income).

The wife’s reliance upon Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, Walker v. Walker, 116 N.H. 717 (1976), and Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159 (1987), for the proposition that a statutory change that affects substantive rights may be applied only prospectively is misplaced.

in the light of all the circumstances then existing.” Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195 (1967) (citations omitted); see also Walker v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413, 417 (1990); Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161-62 (1987); Healey v. Healey, 117 N.H. 618, 621 (1977).

Because of this, we have held that the rehabilitative principle is not controlling where, for instance: (1) the supported spouse suffers from ill health and is not capable of establishing her own source of income, see Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162 (1987); (2) the supported spouse, in a fault-based divorce, has minimal job experience, no formal education, a learning disability and suffers from anxiety and panic attacks caused by the other spouse’s emotional abuse, see In the Matter of Letendr

The petitioner also mistakenly relies upon Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161 (1987), to support her assertion that RSA 458:19,1, should apply prospectively.

See, e.g., Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161 (1987) (holding that amendments to alimony statute would apply only to orders based upon divorce decrees entered on or after the effective date of the amendments).

We have held that the rehabilitative principle is not controlling where the supported spouse suffers from ill health and is not capable of establishing her own source of income.

Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162, 525 A.2d 267, 269 (1987); Morrill v. Millard (Morrill), 132 N.H. 685, 689, 570 A.2d 387, 389 (1990).

.” We will not set aside a trial court’s decision to alter or terminate alimony absent an abuse of discretion.

Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161-62, 525 A.2d 267, 269 (1987); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 459, 255 A.2d 604, 605 (1969).

She attempts to bolster this argument by utilizing RSA 458:19 (1955), the applicable statute at the time of the divorce, see Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161, 525 A.2d 267, 268 (1987), which allows alimony payments to continue for three years after the youngest child reaches the age of majority.

recommendation, which the Superior Court (Dalianis, J.) subsequently approved, was that the three-year provision in RSA 458:19 was inapplicable, reasoning that Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 525 A.2d 267 (1987) (holding new statute applicable only prospectively) was distinguishable on its facts.

The plaintiff next cites Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162-63, 525 A.2d 267, 269 (1987), in challenging the adequacy of the master’s findings to support an indefinite alimony award of $80 a week in addition to half of the plaintiff’s pension of $525 a month.

The spouse who is awarded alimony is awarded such payments in order to encourage the recipient to establish an independent source of income.

1, 1986 (section amended generally, three-year provision removed); Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161, 525 A.2d 267, 268 (1987) (RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1986) is applicable only to orders based upon divorce decrees entered on or after January 1, 1986).