Cited by

The defendant cites only State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175 (1987), in support of his argument.

Nonetheless, the defective warrant infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional rights only if the effort to obtain evidence constituted a search in the constitutional sense.

The defendant first argues the affidavit’s reference to her “red and glassy” eyes was a material misrepresentation of fact that was recklessly made, and therefore the evidence derived from the warrant should have been suppressed.

Accordingly, we postpone consideration of the reasonable expectation of privacy test until another day.” State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189-90, 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996) (citation omitted); see State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 181, 536 A.2d 1252, 1256-57 (1987), cert.

State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 192-94, 536 A.2d 1252, 1264-65 (1987) (court reviews staleness based on the totality of evidence including reasonable inferences that drug activity has continued).

If older information, despite its age, “contributes to an inference that probable cause exists at the time of the application, its age is no taint.” State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 192, 536 A.2d 1252, 1264 (1987), cert.

We have rejected the argument that any effort by the government to obtain evidence should be treated as a search within the meaning of the State Constitution because it is inconsistent with the reasoning of the agent-informer cases.

The parties have not “address[ed] the[] interpretive alternatives here, where neither side has briefed the background of article 19 and the history of its application as bearing on the extent to which Katz may be a sound guide to our own constitution.” State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 181, 536 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1987), cert.

See, e.g., State v. Alosa, 137 N.H. 33, 37, 623 A.2d 218, 221 (1993); State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 180-81, 536 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1987), cert.

Accordingly, we limit our decision to “the theory of the case as it has been presented to us.” State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 179-80, 536 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1987), cert.

State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 181, 536 A.2d 1252, 1257 (1987) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)), cert.

1987); cf. State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175,184, 536 A.2d 1252, 1258-59 (1987) (“What is crucial...

State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 191, 536 A.2d 1252, 1262-63 (1987) (an omission is material if it is “necessary for the finding of probable cause”), cert.

Unlike the United States Supreme Court, we have neither adopted nor rejected the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis for purposes of determining what constitutes an invasion of protected interests under part I, article 19.

denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 196-97, 536 A.2d 1252, 1257 (1987), cert.

State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 191, 536 A.2d 1252, 1263 (1987); see also Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964).

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 171-72 (1978); State v. Valenzuela, 130 N.H. 175, 536 A.2d 1252 (1987); see also State v. Stiles, 128 N.H. 81, 85, 512 A.2d 1084, 1088 (1986).