Cited by

Citing State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126 (1987), and Crosby v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 152 N.H. 44 (2005), the defendant argued that because the State was aware that he was serving another sentence at the time that he executed the agreement, and the agreement was silent as to whether the new sentences would be served concurrently with, or consecutively to

Sentencing courts have the discretion to pronounce sentences concurrent with or consecutive to one 4 another.

See, e.g., State v. Enderson, 148 N.H. 252, 254-55 (2002); State v. Steed, 140 N.H. 153, 158-59 (1995); State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 128 (1987); State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 213 (1979); State v. Ferbert, 113 N.H. 235, 236-38 (1973).

In the trial court, the defendant argued that this sentence was unconstitutional under State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126 (1987).

They may provide for terms of imprisonment, probation, conditional or unconditional discharge, or a fine.” State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 129 (1987) (citing RSA 651:2 (Supp. 1986)).

is silent as to whether the sentences imposed on each count or indictment are to run concurrently or consecutively, the presumption is that the sentences run concurrently.” State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 130 (1987).

They may provide for terms of imprisonment, probation, conditional or unconditional discharge, or a fine.” State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 129 (1987).

The State relies upon State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126 (1987), to support its argument: RSA 651:3, III, repealed in 1975, provided in pertinent part that “any multiple sentences of imprisonment imposed on any person shall bo served concurrently.” Since its repeal, New Hampshire law no longer specifies whether multiple sentences imposed run concurrently or consecutively.

At the conclusion of a sentencing proceeding, a defendant and the society which brought him to court must know in plain and certain terms what punishment has been exacted by the court.

As we have stated in another context, “at some point the sentencing process must come to an end.” State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 131 (1987).

To hold otherwise would effectively modify the terms of the original sentencing order and result in fundamental unfairness.

Likewise, if the terms of a sentence are not entirely clear at the time of sentencing, we will not speculate about what sentence the court might have intended; rather, we will construe the sentencing order so as to enforce the *53 terms that are clear but not to augment the sentence beyond such terms.

Second, she maintained that ordering consecutive sentences for the probation violation, where her original sentences were to run concurrently, violated the requirement of determinate sentences set forth in State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 523 A.2d 98 (1987).

He places great faith upon our discussion of protected rights in the sentencing process as set forth in Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 453 A.2d 1304 (1982); State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 523 A.2d 98 (1987); and State v. Ingerson, 130 N.H. 112, 536 A.2d 161 (1987).

*835 Both parties rely primarily on State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 523 A.2d 98 (1987) and Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 453 A.2d 1304 (1982) to support their contentions that the March 25 order was plain, certain and determinable, even though the defendant and the State interpret the order differently.

*493 As we have previously stated, “[t]rial judges are vested with broad discretionary powers with regard to sentencing.” State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 129, 523 A.2d 98, 100 (1987); see also State v. Morehouse, 120 N.H. 738, 742, 424 A.2d 798, 800 (1980); see N.H. Const, pt.

The State is correct in asserting that the trial court should be left with broad discretion in regard to sentencing.