Cited by

generally State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 82-83 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring specially).

As our former colleague, Justice Souter, observed, “If we place too much reliance on federal precedent we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will render State practice incoherent.” State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 83 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring).

State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 73, 522 A.2d 1380, 1383 (1986) (quotations, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

An informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis of knowledge than does an informant who relates not what he knows personally, but what he has heard others say.

State v. Kellenbeck, 124 N.H. at 764-65, 474 A.2d at 1391; see State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 80, 522 A.2d 1380, 1387 (1986) (Batchelder, J., concurring specially) (probable cause determinations must be made by court officers, not law enforcement officials).

We note that this principle applies whether we upset the granting of a motion to suppress when the State appeals, see, e.g., Caicedo, 135 N.H. at 126, 599 A.2d at 897, or affirm the denial of such a motion following the defendant’s appeal, see, e.g., State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 74, 522 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1986).

Nonetheless, it is not the policy of this State to require a defendant to develop such a State analysis in order to preserve his State constitutional claim.

To the extent that we look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance *230 in approaching these difficult issues, we borrow only the analytical framework of the Court’s decisions in our interpretation of part I, article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and as such, we are not “tied to present or future federal pronouncements on the issue.” State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 73, 522 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1986).

Finally, we conclude our discussion of the constitutionality of this search by emphasizing that although we look to federal law, specifically Chambers v. Maroney, United States v. Place, and United States v. Ross, for guidance in interpreting part I, article 19 of the State Constitution, we uphold this warrantless search on the basis of our own interpretation of the New Hampshire Constitution.

State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 72, 522 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1986) (distinguishing case of “mere passing reference” to State Constitution).

The State further urges this court to adopt the similar test proposed by Chief Justice Brock in State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 522 A.2d 1380 (1986) as the appropriate standard under part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution by which to evaluate the validity of search warrants based upon information from confidential informants.

In addition, another basic principle to which we adhere is the preference which we accord warrants, and the *485 deference which we afford magistrates, especially in close cases.’” Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 74, 522 A.2d 1380, 1383 (1986) (quoting State v. Jaroma, 128 N.H. 423, 428, 514 A.2d 1274, 1277 (1986)) (citations omitted).

In re N.H. Disabilities Rights Center, Inc., 130 N.H. 328, 541 A.2d 208 (1988); State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 522 A.2d 1380 (1986).

Because the State claim is thus left unexplored, it is not properly before us for decision.

State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 82, 522 A.2d 1380, 1388 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring) (applicability of Mandravelis under part I, article 19 of the Constitution of New Hampshire is an open question).

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); see State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 522 A.2d 1380 (1986).