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Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Vermont Mutual Insurance v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800.

16 citing documents.

Thomas Todd v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company & A 137 A.3d 1115 N.H. 2016
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 524 (1986) (emphasis added).
Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Beverly P. Mutrie 167 N.H. 108 N.H. 2014
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 523 (1986) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).
State Farm Insurance v. Bruns 942 A.2d 1275 N.H. 2008
Marikar v. Peerless Insurance 855 A.2d 1246 N.H. 2004
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 523 (1986) (quotation omitted).
EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's 848 A.2d 715 N.H. 2004
State Farm Mutual Insurance v. Pitman 809 A.2d 1280 N.H. 2002
In Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986), we determined that the term “accident” was unambiguous and defined it as “an undesigned contingency, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.” Id.
Lebroke v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance 769 A.2d 392 N.H. 2001
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 523 (1986) (quotations omitted).
EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Continental Insurance 781 A.2d 969 N.H. 2001
On appeal, ENGI argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to find that the term “accident” is ambiguous and should therefore *159 be construed in ENGI’s favor; (2) impermissibly expanding the inherently injurious analysis developed in Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986); (3) failing to consider, in conducting the inherently injurious analysis, what was in the mind of the insured; and (4) granting summary judgment when there were material facts in dispute.
Martin v. Maine Mutual Fire Insurance 764 A.2d 911 N.H. 2000
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 523, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (1986) (quotations omitted).
Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Health & Human Services 761 A.2d 431 N.H. 2000
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. DeValencia 949 P.2d 525 Ariz. Ct. App. 1997
High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance 648 A.2d 474 N.H. 1994
Green Mountain Insurance v. Foreman 641 A.2d 230 N.H. 1994
Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 524, 517 A.2d 800, 803 (1986) (quotation omitted); see also Fisher v. Fitchburg Mut.
Providence Mutual Fire Insurance v. Scanlon 638 A.2d 1246 N.H. 1994
Further, applying Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 517 A.2d 800 (1986), the superior court found that because Jeffrey’s actions were not so inherently injurious as to be certain to cause the injury, the injury was “accidental.” Finally, it awarded Ronda Haines her court costs and attorney’s fees, citing RSA 491:22-b (1983).
Fisher v. Fitchburg Mutual Insurance 560 A.2d 630 N.H. 1989
Second, the plaintiffs argue that even if the actions alleged by the Arlisses in the underlying suits are deemed intentional, they are not inherently injurious or patently hazardous, and they should therefore still be viewed as an occurrence under the test set forth in Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 524, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (1986).
Jespersen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 551 A.2d 530 N.H. 1988
We recently stated the relevant legal rules in Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 517 A.2d 800 (1986).

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