Cited by

(quotation omitted); see Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 379 (1986) (“The degree of procedural protection required varies and must be determined with reference both to the individual right or expectation in question and to the public interest that justifies a limitation on the right.” (citations omitted)).

Thus, a defendant’s interest in parole eligibility is not a liberty interest sufficient to form the basis of a due process claim.

Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 380-81 (1986) (“Although any State legislature is free to provide that parole is a matter of right rather than a subject of discretion, the General Court of this State has not done so” and, “[i]n the absence of some provision grounded in State law mandating a prisoner’s release upon proof of certain ascertainable fac

at 642 (brackets omitted) (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005)); see Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 379 (1986) (“The degree of procedural *704 protection required varies and must be determined with reference both to the individual right or expectation in question and to the public interest that justifies a limitation on the right.” (citations omitted)).

However, because the defendant has asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to deprive him of his liberty, see Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 378 (1986), the legality of imposing his suspended sentence is properly before us on discretionary appeal to the extent that he presented these arguments to the trial court in the first instance.

State v. LeCouffe, 152 N.H. 148, 152-53 (2005) (no right to suspension of sentence); Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 380 (1986) (no right to parole); State v. Drewry, 141 N.H. 514, 516 (1996) (revocation of a privilege is a traditional attribute of a remedial action).

Under the first prong of the analysis, an individual’s right to work within one’s profession is a “privilege of fundamental significance.” Plantier, 126 N.H. at 507, 494 A.2d at 273; cf. Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 378-79, 513 A.2d 956, 958-59 (1986) (recognizing a hierarchy of protected interests in habeas corpus proceedings).

The parole board’s denial of parole did not “double” the plaintiff’s sentence, but rather simply requires him to serve the sentence he originally received.

Our analysis of liberty interests begins with part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and with the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

[and] to protect the public from criminal acts by parolees.” RSA 651-A:1 (Supp. 1994); Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 380-81, 513 A.2d 956, 960 (1986).

In Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 513 A.2d 956 (1986), for example, we held that the procedural due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment did not apply to parole board hearings even though such *322 hearings were required under RSA 651-A:6.

In Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 513 A.2d 956 (1986), this court explained the analysis we must use to review the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Because article 15 guarantees due process for the protection of “life, liberty [and] estate,” every demand for due process protection must begin on the most fundamental level by identifying the interest in life, liberty or property that will arguably suffer without the process claimed to be due.