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Even when the defendant is not confronting a witness or evidence, due process as guaranteed by Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution protects his right to be present “whenever the defendant’s presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651 (1986) (quotation and brackets omitted); see United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985).

Corliss v. Mary Hitchcock Mem’l Hosp., 127 N.H. 225, 226 (1985); State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 650 (1986).

is not directly implicated in this case.” State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848, 849 (1986).

I, art. 15; see State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848, 849 (1986).

While a criminal defendant has a due process interest in being present at his or her trial, cf. State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848, 849 (1986), the State has an interest in parental rights termination cases not present in criminal cases.

State v. Brodowski, 135 N.H. 197, 201, 600 A.2d 925, 927 (1991); State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 652, 517 A.2d 848, 850 (1986).

State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 652, 517 A.2d 848, 850 (1986) (trial court has duty to record its ex parte voir dire because record permits appellate review, ensures impartial jury, and protects opportunity to be heard).

State v. Brodowski, 135 N.H. 197, 201, 600 A.2d 925, 927 (1991); State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 652, 517 A.2d 848, 850 (1986); Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421, 503 A.2d at 767.

The defendant’s right under the State Constitution to be present at trial derives from the specific guarantees set forth in part I, article 15 “to produce all favorable proofs, confront witnesses, and be fully heard in one’s defense, as well as the right to due process.” State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848, 849 (1986) (citations omitted).

court stated, “I have designated the foreperson with this jury as I have done with virtually every criminal case I have tried in the last year and a half.” We proceed by considering the defendant’s rights under State law, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. at 231, 471 A.2d at 350, addressing “federal constitutional issues only insofar as federal law would provide greater protection.” State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848, 849 (1986).

Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421, 503 A.2d at 767; see also State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 652, 517 A.2d 848, 850 (1986) (“when ex parte discussions are held off the record, the defendant is deprived of access to the information needed to effectively exercise his right to challenge a juror”); United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1049 (4th Cir. 1977) (court’s voir dire examination must allow the defenda

The defendant also relies on State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 517 A.2d 848 (1986), and State v. Jones, 125 N.H. 490, 484 A.2d 1070 (1984), in support of his argument.

The defendant argues that under State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 652-53, 517 A.2d 848, 850 (1986), any communication ex parte that a trial judge has with the jury after they have been sworn, and prior to verdict, is error.