Cited by

See, e.g., Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 280, 282, 285, 287 (1986) (holding, in the context of the Child Protection Act’s Reporting Law, that parents’ due process rights had been violated because they had not received adequate notice that the State had recorded a “founded” neglect allegation against them in the central registry); Ladd v. Coleman, 128 N.H. 5

“The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 286 (1986) (“Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).

Veale, 158 N.H. at 638-39; Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 284 (1986) (“The general rule is that a person’s liberty may be impaired when governmental action seriously damages his standing and associations in the community.”); cf. Clark v. Manchester, 113 N.H. 270, 7 274 (1973) (holding that an employee was not entitled to due proce

See, e.g., Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275,287 (1986) (holding that for finding of child abuse or neglect to be validly maintained in division for children, youth and families (DCYF) central registry, perpetrator must be provided written notice of the report on which the allegations are based and the reasons for DCYF’s determination, access to pertinent DCYF d

In Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 284 (1986), we stated that “[t]he general rule is that a person’s liberty may be impaired when governmental action seriously damages his standing and associations in the community.” We also “recognized that the stigmatization that attends certain governmental determi *639 nations may amount to a deprivation of consti

*552 In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 686 (1993) (quotations omitted); see Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 285 (1986).

We have previously held that the entry of such a finding in the central registry implicates a liberty interest within the meaning of Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 288 (1986); Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46-47 (1993).

The first step in a due process analysis is to “determine whether the challenged procedures concern a legally protected interest.” *114 Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282-83 (1986).

RSA 169-C:31 provides that anyone making a good faith report pursuant to the chapter is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.

Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 285, 513 A.2d 331, 338-39 (1986); cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (applying similar three-factor test to determine the extent of process due in parental rights termination proceedings).

Second, we determine whether the procedures afford the requisite safeguards.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282-83, 513 A.2d 331, 337 (1986).

“[T]he law of the land” is synonymous with “due process of law.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 337 (1986).

private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

The test for adequacy of notice is whether the defendant has received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 286, 513 A.2d 331, 339 (1986).

Because the United States Constitution provides no greater protection than does our State Constitution under these circumstances, we need not analyze his federal due process claim.

The State concedes that a petitioner normally has a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in being free from the stigmatization that attaches to one’s reputation upon being labelled a child abuser, citing dicta from our opinion in Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 283, 513 A.2d 331, 337 (1986).

Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 284, 513 A.2d 331, 338 (1986) (information in central registry of division for children and youth services that petitioner’s husband was perpetrator of child abuse would prevent petitioner from obtaining daycare license); see also Petition of Breau, 132 N.H. at 364, 565 A.2d at 1052 (State agency may rely on factua

est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.’ ” State v. Poulicakos, 131 N.H. 709, 712-13, 559 A.2d 1341, 1343 (1989) (quoting Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 285, 513 A.2d 331, 338-39 (1986)).

“Accordingly, the petitioners are entitled to the limited determination of whether the Board ‘exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, otherwise acted illegally, abused its discretion, or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.’” Petition of Ann Crane, supra at 299, 564 A.2d at 452 (citing Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 336 (1986)).

This court will grant certiorari and reverse the decision of an agency such as the State Board where it “exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, otherwise acted illegally, abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 336 (1986).

Our certiorari jurisdiction to review administrative orders limits us to enquiring whether the agency “exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, otherwise acted illegally, abused its discretion, or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 336 (1986).

Accordingly, the petitioners are entitled to the limited determination of whether the Board “exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, otherwise acted illegally, abused its discretion, or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 336 (1986).

When the DCYS finds probable cause to believe abuse has occurred, the alleged child abuser has a due process right to notice of that finding and a hearing to challenge that determination.

y the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the *713 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 285, 513 A.2d 331, 338-39 (1936).

Our opinion in Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 280-81, 513 A.2d 331, 335-36 (1986) describes the statutory scheme providing for the central registry, and here it is sufficient to add that a child care facility may not be licensed under RSA chapter 170-E if it employs anyone listed in the registry.

.” We have consistently interpreted “‘the law of the land’ as synonymous with ‘due process of law.’” Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 282, 513 A.2d 331, 337 (1986) (citing Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 54-55 (1817)).