Cited by

State v. Oakes, 161 N.H. 270, 285 (2010); State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986).

In terms of questions about his real identity, if that’s asked, he would be taking his Fifth Amendment rights.” We note at the outset that the defendant did not preserve a state constitutional claim because he made no reference at the hearing to the State Constitution.

An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if: (1) the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight; State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 637 (1986), or (2) the evidence that was improperly admitted or excluded is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt, State v. Peters, 162 N.H. 30, 36-38 (2011).

Because the plaintiff does not cite the State Constitution, we limit our analysis to the Federal Constitution.

Accordingly, we address his argument solely under the federal constitution.

Because Father does not cite the State Constitution, we limit our analysis to the Federal Constitution.

After the 1 Because the defendant does not invoke Part I, Article 14 of the State Constitution on appeal, we limit our speedy trial analysis to the Federal Constitution.

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986) (discussing the requisites of preserving a state constitutional argument for appellate review).

5 In order to trigger a State constitutional analysis, “the defendant must raise the State constitutional issue below” and “the defendant’s brief must specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution.” State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986).

Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004); see also State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986) (regarding requisites for preserving a state constitutional claim for our review).

e defendant further contends that “the State cannot convict [him] if his words enjoy constitutional protection under the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution] or under the free speech clause of Part I, Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” The defendant, however, failed to raise his state constitutional argument in the trial court and thus it is not preserved for our review.

To preserve a state constitutional claim for appellate review, a defendant must: (1) raise it in the trial court; and (2) on appeal, specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in his or her brief.

at 406 (observing that the trial court found the defendant’s confession to be voluntary, in part, because of “the absence of threats, violence or coercion of any kind and the absence of promises or undue influence”); see State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 636 (1986).

2 Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant preserved a state constitutional issue for review, but see State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986) (to preserve a state constitutional claim, the defendant must raise it in the trial court and specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in his brief); State v. Porter, 144 N.H. 96, 100-01 (1999) (rules of preservation are not relaxed for a self-represented party), we cannot conclude that he

The defendant challenges the trial court’s probable cause ruling under the Federal Constitution.

To preserve a state constitutional claim, the respondent had to: (1) raise it in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in her brief.

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 634 (1986) (finding that officer called out defendant’s nickname in the jail cell area in order to elicit an incriminating answer); State v. Beaupre, 123 N.H. 155, 158 (1983) (finding detective’s invitation to the defendant to make a statement constituted custodial interrogation in violation of defendant’s right to c

We therefore address his claim only under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Thus, we decline to review it.

We consider her argument under only the United States Constitution because she does not specifically invoke a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution in her brief.

Assuming, without deciding, that the petitioners adequately preserved this claim under both the State and Federal Constitutions, see State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163 (1986); N.H. Dep't of Envtl.

To preserve a state constitutional claim, the defendant must: (1) raise it in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in his brief.

Because the defendant has not cited a specific provision of the State Constitution in her brief, we review her claim under only the Federal Due Process Clause.

To preserve this issue, the defendant must: (1) raise it in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution in his brief.

We therefore refuse to address these assertions.

Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate that he raised a state constitutional issue in the trial court, we conclude that he has not preserved his State Confrontation Clause argument for appellate review.

To trigger a constitutional analysis on appeal, the appealing party must raise the constitutional issue below.

v. Town of Bethlehem, 150 N.H. 606, 619 (2004); see also State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 682 (1986).

We will not address a party’s State constitutional argument on appeal if the party does not specifically invoke in its brief a provision of the State Constitution.

An appellant must fulfill two preconditions before triggering a State constitutional analysis: first, the appellant must raise the State constitutional issue in the trial court; second, the appellant’s brief must specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution.

This means that when a defendant specifically invokes the State Constitution, we will consider those constitutional claims before addressing federal claims.

Thus, in State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 634 (1986), we noted that when a police officer entered the cell block and called out a name known to be the nickname of the perpetrator of a crime, “[i]t is obvious that [the officer] did so in order to prompt an incriminating answer.” We then concluded that the officer “at the very least should have known that he w

While the facts were similar in State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 630-31, 636-37 (1986), we did not there consider the significance of the absence of a time lapse between the unwarned and the post -Miranda confession.

We agree with the State that the respondent has not preserved a due process claim under our State Constitution, see State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986), but we find that she has sufficiently preserved a federal constitutional claim that she was deprived of her “fundamental right to be a parent.” We do not, however, need to examine whether the respondent’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution or Part I, A

We next consider whether the probate court’s error requires reversal.

id.; State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986); State v. Westover, 127 N.H. 130, 131 (1985).

Because the defendant does not invoke Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution on appeal, we limit our due process analysis to the Federal Constitution.

Because he does not invoke a specific provision of the State Constitution on appeal, we limit our analysis to the Federal Constitution.

Because he did not unambiguously and *47 specifically raise the vagueness issue grounded in the due process provision of the New Hampshire Constitution, we address only his federal claim.

Because we reach the same result on different grounds, however, any error in the trial court’s analysis was harmless.

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986) (claim limited to Federal Constitution where State Constitution not specifically invoked on appeal).

Before triggering a State constitutional analysis, the defendant must unambiguously and specifically assert the State constitutional foundation for his objection.

Although a defendant not previously warned must receive a Miranda warning when he is confronted with a custodial interrogation, see, e.g., State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 633, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986), if he is warned prior to this moment, the Constitution does not mandate that he be warned again when the custodial interrogation actually begins.

For Miranda warnings to apply, we require “a custodial interrogation” by the police.

See, e.g., Belcher v. Paine, 136 N.H. 137, 149, 612 A.2d 1318, 1326 (1992); State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986).

State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 635-37, 517 A.2d 1163, 1168 (1986) (under Federal Constitution, only coerced unwarned statements require suppression of derivative evidence).

Accordingly, no issue under the State Constitution is properly before us. State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986).

Since the defendant’s notice of appeal makes no reference to any provision of the State Constitution, we consider this issue solely under the Constitution of the United States.

“In determining the gravity of an error, this court asks whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 637, 517 A.2d 1163, 1169 (1986) (quotation omitted).

We have held, however, that in order to trigger a State constitutional analysis, the defendant must raise the State constitutional issue below and his brief must specifically invoke a provision of the State Constitution.