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The purpose of notice pleading is to inform one’s opponent of “the theory and relief sought.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986).

As we have explained in other related contexts, “good cause” is a broader standard than a standard requiring proof of “accident, mistake or misfortune and not neglect.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94-95 (1986) (quotations and ellipses omitted); see Donnelly v. Eastman, 149 N.H. 631, 633 (2003).

The good cause standard “does not explicitly bar relief from all consequences of human neglect.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986).

Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986) (finding that alternative relief first raised in requests for rulings of law “offended the elementary principle that must be enforced, even in this lenient jurisdiction, that pleadings must inform the opponent of the theory and relief sought” (quotation and ellipsis omitted)); see also Thompson v. C&C Resea

The trial court likewise could have ordered the plaintiffs to reimburse the town for the costs and attorney’s fees that it incurred in attending the structuring conference.

This rule “does not explicitly bar relief from all consequences of human neglect.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986).

This standard “does not explicitly bar relief from all consequences of human neglect.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986).

This standard “does not explicitly bar relief from all consequences of human neglect,” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986), and contemplates that, in exercising its discretion, the trial court will consider whether a sanction short of dismissal or default is sufficient to remedy a party’s noncompliance, see DeButts v. LaRoche, 142 N.H. 845, 847 (1998); Perron, 128 N.H. at 95.

Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 95 (1986) (court did not err in refusing to consider theory of unjust enrichment not properly raised before trial).

Ct. R. Preface; see also Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94-95 (1986) (noting different analysis of clerical error under former Preface to Superior Court Rules and District and Municipal Court Rule 1.1, which allows waiver of rules for “good cause and as justice may require” (quotation omitted)).

Here, we note that no record of the hearing on the merits has been provided to us. “Consequently, for purposes of this appeal we must assume that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings, and must limit our review to legal errors apparent on the face of the record that we have.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94 (1986) (citation omitted).

In the absence of a taped or stenographic record, we “must assume that the evidence presented supported the trial court’s findings, and our review is limited to legal errors apparent on the face of the record.” State v. Cox, 133 N.H. 261, 265, 575 A.2d 1320, 1323 (1990); see also Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94, 508 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1986).

must limit our review to legal errors apparent on the face of the record that we have.” Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94, 508 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1986) (citations omitted).

Despite these concerns, in the absence of a taped or stenographic record of the Howard hearing, we must assume that the evidence presented supported the trial court’s findings, and our review is limited to legal errors apparent on the face of the record.

In the absence of a transcript we will assume, further, that the judge had an evidentiary basis for his finding that plaintiff’s counsel had stated that position at the hearing.

*663 Where no record of a hearing is made, we must assume, for the purposes of appeal, that the evidence supported the master’s findings, and we limit our review to legal errors apparent on the record available to us. Perron v. Aranosian, 128 N.H. 92, 94, 508 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1986); Cote v. Cote, 123 N.H. 376, 377-78, 461 A.2d 566, 567 (1983).