Cited by

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563 (1985).

However, in Opinion of the Justices, we observed that the statute of limitations contained in RSA 541-B:14, IV could potentially violate the equal protection clauses, and, in fact, would violate the equal protection clauses absent the inclusion of the “discovery rule.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 566 (1985); see RSA 508:4 (2010).

The trial court observed that the plaintiff had “failed to cite any supreme court opinions actually applying any tolling provision to RSA 541-B:14 in the thirty- plus years since” we issued Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554 (1985).

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 566 (1985).

Planning or discretionary functions are functions that are “characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563 (1985) (quotation omitted).

“Our prior cases establish that neither Part I, Article 14 nor the equal protection guarantee is violated when the State immunizes itself and its municipalities from liability for intentional torts by governmental employees acting under a reasonable belief that the offending conduct was authorized by law.” Id.; see Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 564-65 (1985); City of Dover v. Imperial Cas.

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 566-67 (1985).

16 “The doctrine of sovereign immunity is deeply entrenched in this jurisdiction.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 557 (1985) (quotation omitted).

City of Dover, 133 N.H. at 115 (addressing municipal immunity); Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 564-65 (1985) (addressing immunity of State).

RSA 541-B:14,1, II;:19,1(d); accord Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 562 (1985).

“When the particular conduct which caused the injury is one characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning, governmental entities should remain immune from liability.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563 (1985) (quotation omitted).

App. 1996); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 559-60 (1985) (identifying four considerations supporting continuation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity).

We have stated that “[t]he purpose of this provision is to make civil remedies readily available, and to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory infringements on access to courts.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 559 (1985) (quotation and brackets omitted).

must prove that the offending State employee not only lacked a reasonable belief in the lawfulness of his conduct, but also acted within the scope of his employment.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 565, 493 A.2d 1182, 1190 (1985).

With these principles in mind, we examine “the broad spectrum of official actions that can be called discretionary, [to determine the] point at which the exercise of discretion is no longer characterized by a choice of policy and becomes simply a choice of means to implement policy.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563, 493 A.2d 1182, 1189 (1985); see, e.g., Bergeron, 140 N.H. at 422, 666 A.2d at 985.

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563, 493 A.2d 1182, 1189 (1985).

imes blurred, we have adopted the following test to distinguish the different types of functions: “When the particular conduct which caused the injury is one characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning, governmental entities should remain immune from liability.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563, 493 A.2d 1182, 1189 (1985) (quotation omitted).

*205 We do not doubt that the decision to place or not to place a guardrail on a roadway is conduct “characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning.” Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 563, 493 A.2d 1182, 1189 (1985) (quotation omitted).

RSA 99-D:l (adopting sovereign immunity as the law of the State); see also Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985).

Hosp., 128 N.H. 366, 368-69, 515 A.2d 1199, 1200-01 (1986); Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 N.H. *54 687, 693, 506 A.2d 310, 314 (1986); Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 559, 493 A.2d 1182, 1186 (1985); State v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 197, 470 A.2d 869, 877 (1983) (Douglas and Batchelder, JJ., concurring specially); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 524-27, 464 A.2d 288, 294-95 (1983); Henderson Clay Prod's, Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assoc's, Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 801

The ruling was based on a prior Superior Court (Temple, J.) decision, Bisson v. Town of Farmington, No. 86-C-574 (where RSA 507-B:2, I, was held to be unconstitutional), and on Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985) (where language similar to that found in RSA 507-B:2,1, was found not to be “constitutionally justifiable”).

This court’s Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985) held unconstitutional a provision for State immunity which is virtually identical to RSA *244 507-B:2.

We expressed our opinion, in an Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985), that the increase in the recovery limitation per claimant was constitutional since the “limit adequately balances the competing interests of the State and of the personal injury plaintiff at this time.” Id.

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 562, 493 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1985); accord Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, 19, 509 A.2d 746, 747-48 (1986).

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985).

our recent review of governmental immunity convinces us that there is no justification for eroding the general rule announced in Merrill supra, see Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985), and for that reason we cannot recognize the cause of action that the plaintiffs urge upon us. Although this resolves the first issue, before leaving it we should take note of several problems that would have arisen if we had not found the statutory remedy adequate or the general immunity do

Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182 (1985); City of Berlin v. State, 124 N.H. 627, 632-33, 474 A.2d 1025, 1028 (1984); see also RSA 99-D:l (Supp. 1983); RSA 491:8.