Cited by

Relying upon State v. Bailey, the trial court reasoned that RSA 265-A:3 suggests that the legislature intended that injury of more than one person in a collision caused by an intoxicated driver could result in multiple charges.

Moreover, where the statute on its face involves no ambiguity, the rule of lenity is irrelevant.

(legislative history to be consulted to aid statutory analysis if statute is ambiguous; if both statute and history are ambiguous, rule of lenity applies); State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 (1986) (“Lenity thus serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.” (quotations omitted)).

Third, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 (1986) (quotation omitted).

Third, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 (1986) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996).

Third, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 (1986).

There is little question that the facts charged in any of the indictments at issue in this case would not, if true, sustain any of the remaining indictments.

*492 The defendant nonetheless argues that a second prosecution of the remaining indictments violates part I, article 16 because “a subsequent jury will hear-exactly the same evidence as the first jury.” The essential inquiry on this point is “whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986) (quotation omitted).

The rule of lenity serves as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously.

“[T]he benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State [is] an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986) (quotation omitted).

is the legislature’s articulated intent.

When considering the issue of double jeopardy, a subsequent prosecution is permissible only if “‘proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.’” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quoting State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986), itself quoting Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468, 473, 464 A.2d 275, 278 (1983)) (emphasis in original).

When cumulative punishments are sought for offenses arising out of a single transaction, the focus of the inquiry is whether “proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 454, 567 A.2d 986, 988 (1989) (quoting State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986), itself quoting Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468, 473, 464 A.2d 275, 278 (1983)) (emphasis in original).

Multiple indictments are permissible only if “proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 813, 508 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1986) (quoting Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468, 473, 464 A.2d 275, 278 (1983)) (emphasis in original); see State v. Elbert, 128 N.H. 210, 512 A.2d 1114 (1986).