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The relationship between party and non-party implied by a finding of privity has been described as one of “virtual representation” and “substantial identity.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571 (1987) (quotations omitted).

at 534 (quotations and citation omitted); see Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359, 368-69 (1995); Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571 (1987).

Thus, we cannot conclude that “something in the relationship” between the District and Lempster “justifies holding the latter to the result reached in litigation in which only the former is named.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 572 (1987).

Under this exception, “a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she assumed control over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered.” Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 895 (quotation and brackets omitted); see RESTATEMENT, supra § 39; see also Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571 (1987).

Direct review of a damages award “is the responsibility of the trial judge, who may disturb a verdict as excessive (or inadequate) if its amount is conclusively against the weight of the evidence.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 588 (1987) (quotation omitted).

Ct. R. 72; Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 583 (1987).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561 (1987).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 579 (1987).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 588, 534 A.2d 689, 704 (1987).

I. Collateral Estoppel “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

if the verdict is manifestly exorbitant.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 588, 534 A.2d 689, 704 (1987) (citations and quotations omitted).

at 329-30, 565 A.2d at 1040; see also Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 576, 534 A.2d 689, 696-97 (1987) (applying rule on inconsistent verdicts to civil case); cf. Amabello v. Colonial Motors, 117 N.H. 556, 561, 374 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1977) (noting that there is a “significant difference between the rigorous standard for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.

Co., 119 N.H. 457, 463, 404 A.2d 1094, 1097 (1979), overruled in part by Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689 (1987); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395 A.2d 843, 846-47 (1978).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Co., 119 N.H. 457, 463-64, 404 A.2d 1094, 1098 (1979), overruled in part by Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689 (1987); see Chellman, 138 N.H. at 79-80, 637 A.2d at 152.

In its most basic formulation, “the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987); accord Dennis v. R.I. Hosp.

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Wrecking Co., 629 A.2d 1116, 1126 (Conn. 1993) (quotation and brackets omitted); see also Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571, 534 A.2d 689, 694 (1987) (privity in estoppel context described as one of “virtual representation” and “substantial identity”).

at 123, 635 A.2d at 495, such that the interests of the non-party “were in fact represented and protected in the [prior] litigation,” Daigle v. City of *369 Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571, 534 A.2d 689, 694 (1987) (quotation omitted).

The elements of collateral estoppel are well-established: “the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each action, the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the merits, and the party to be estopped must have appeared in the first action, or have been in privity with someone who did so.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Our interpretation of the statute turns on the meaning of “the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980); cf. Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 56, 226 A.2d 867, 869 (1967) (eollataral estoppel only applicable to those matters “directly in issue”).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689 (1987) (Daigle I).

“The process of stating objections to the charge is not a mere predicate for a later appeal; the object is to advise the trial judge of a claim of error that can be addressed before any damage is beyond correction in the trial court.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 583, 534 A.2d 689, 701 (1987).

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987) (issue to be estopped must be finally resolved on the merits).

For collateral estoppel to apply, “the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each action, the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the merits, and the party to be estopped must have appeared as a party in the first action, or have been in privity with someone who did so.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

In Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987), we stated: “At its core, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689 (1987) (Daigle I); Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 131 N.H. 319, 553 A.2d 291 (1988) (Daigle II); Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 133 N.H. 498, 577 A.2d 1236 (1990) (Daigle III).

A trial judge may order remittitur or, in the alternative, order a new trial on the issue of damages if the amount of a jury’s verdict is “conclusively against the weight of the evidence” and “manifestly exorbitant.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 588, 534 A.2d 689, 704 (1987) (quotations omitted).

“The process of stating objections to the charge is not a mere predicate for a later appeal; the object is to advise the trial judge of a claim of error that can be addressed before any damage is beyond correction in the trial court.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 583, 534 A.2d 689, 701 (1987).

Collateral estoppel “bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987) (emphasis added).

Therefore, according to the State, the jury finding in the prior trial meets the three preconditions, set forth in Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987), that must be satisfied in order to apply collateral estoppel.

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Although the parties have addressed the conditions necessary for such issue preclusion at some length, see Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987), we rest our decision on the more fundamental ground that collateral estoppel should not be recognized as between the litigation of a defendant’s habeas petition seeking a new trial and his subsequent retrial on criminal charges.

These inconsistent verdicts were discussed, and Daigle’s collateral estoppel claim was dismissed, in Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 569-75, 534 A.2d 689, 693-96 (1987).

udgment is entered pursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the company.” This language reflects an underlying contractual assumption that as a general rule such a judgment will bind the parties upon satisfaction of the written consent condition, the clear object of which parallels the privity requirement of collateral estoppel, see Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 571, 534 A.2d 689, 694 (1987), in shielding the insurer against the effect of any proc

Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 216, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968); Duncan v. Clements supra.” Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

Thus, making an offer of proof is “not a mere predicate for a later appeal; the object is to advise the trial judge of a claim of error that can be addressed before any damage is beyond correction in the trial court.” See Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 583, 534 A.2d 689, 701 (1987) (discussing Superior Court Rule 72, similar to Rule 103(b)).

If we were to vacate only one, we would never know which one to choose.” Daigle v. Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 576, 534 A.2d 689, 697 (1987) (citations omitted).

Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 216, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968); Duncan v. Clements supra.” Daigle v. Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987).

The facts of these cases and their inconsistent verdicts are discussed in detail in Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 534 A.2d 689 (1987).