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“The party asserting laches bears the burden of proving both that the delay was unreasonable and that prejudice resulted from the delay.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505 (1985) (quotation omitted).

This court has held that the revocation of a license necessary for one’s occupation is a legally protected property right that may not be denied without affording due process.

This court has held that the revocation of a license necessary for one’s occupation is a legally protected property right that may not be denied without affording due process.

The plaintiff relies upon Appeal of Eno, 126 N.H. 650 (1985), and Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500 (1985), which she characterizes as cases in which the plaintiff’s constitutional “right was lost not due to the misconduct of the person protected by the constitution but by the misconduct of another.” She argues that allowing the State “to profit from the disadvantage caused [her] by [its] failure.

parties involved.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505 (1985) (quotations omitted).

This demonstrates that the phrase “any case” in RSA 526:1 was not intended to mean literally “any case,” but, rather, “any case in superior court.” In addition, it is a well settled rule of statutory construction that in the case of conflicting statutory provisions, the specific statute controls over the general statute.

The Utilities’ argument is also contrary to our well-settled rule of statutory construction “that in the case of conflicting statutory provisions, the specific statute controls over the general statute.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 510 (1985) (quotation omitted).

Moreover, in the case of conflicting statutory provisions, the specific statute controls over the more general statute.

In addressing the first factor, we determine whether the interest at stake is a protected liberty or property interest.

governmental capacity, see, e.g., 17 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 49.09, at 216 (3d ed. rev. 1993); 4 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 29.15, at 733-34 (4th ed. 1997), the doctrine *668 that “no laches can be imputed to the government, and against it no time runs so as to bar its rights, is not law in New Hampshire.” State v. Company, 49 N.H. 240, 248 (1870); cf. Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505, 509, 494 A.2d 270, 272, 275 (1985) (applying “laches-type doctrine” to bar hearing

Appeal of Plantier, 126 *92 N.H. 500, 504-05, 494 A.2d 270, 272 (1985); see also Sahu v. Iowa Bd.

Such comments are not prohibited by the relatively greater informality accorded to agency proceedings, where the evidence is mainly documentary rather than testimonial, cf. Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 508, 494 A.2d 270, 274 (1985), and capable of independent evaluation by the board using its expertise, cf. Appeal of Dell, 140 N.H. 484, 496, 668 A.2d 1024, 1033-34 (1995); Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H at 53, 635 A.2d at 464.

We determine whether the hearing satisfied due process under a two-part test.

First, “[t]he primary purposes of RSA chapter 329 are to assure a high quality of medical care and to protect the public from persons unfit to practice medicine.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 508, 494 A.2d 270, 274 (1985).

“[T]he burden is on [the party asserting laches] to show that the complainant’s delay in bringing a complaint was not merely a result of the lack of awareness of the nature of the conduct, but that the complainant, after becoming aware of the misconduct, slept on his rights.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 508, 494 A.2d 270, 274 (1985) (quotation omitted) (applying “laches-type” doctrine to medical license revocation).

The issue before us differs from that presented in Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 494 A.2d 270 (1985), where we applied a “laches-type” doctrine to bar the New Hampshire Board of Registration of Medicine from revoking a physician’s license for specific acts of misconduct.

We will not hold that due process requires that the board anticipate every conceivable type of misconduct in *554 which any of its licensees may indulge, and then fashion and announce a code to fit each act of misconduct.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 513, 494 A.2d 270, 278 (1985)(quotation omitted).

We have held that a “doctor has a legally protected property right in his license to practice medicine and thus is entitled to procedural due process.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 506, 494 A.2d 270, 273 (1985).

‘“Due process requires that a statute proscribing conduct not be so vague as to fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. *400 500, 513, 494 A.2d 270, 277 (1985) (quoting In re Doe, 123 N.H. 634, 641, 465 A.2d 924, 929 (1983)).

Where two statutory provisions conflict, the specific statute controls over the general one.

See, e.g., Carbonneau v. Town of Rye, 120 N.H. 96, 98, 411 A.2d 1110, 1112 (1980) (“injurious, noxious or offensive to the neighborhood” an enforceable standard); see also In re Doe, 123 N.H. 634, 642, 465 A.2d 924, 929 (1983) (authoritative construction can cure vagueness); Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 513, 494 A.2d 270, 278 (1985) (otherwise vague statute not unenforceable where applicable “without question”).

Our initial inquiry is whether there is a protected liberty or property interest at stake.

For the plaintiff to assert a successful due process claim, it must first assert that a protected liberty or property interest is at stake.

Second, it must be determined whether the procedures afford the appropriate procedural safeguards.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505-06, 494 A.2d 270, 272 (1985); Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 756, 423 A.2d 603, 605 (1980).