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State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 529 (1985) (“The State has the burden of justifying the stop of the defendant’s vehicle as a legitimate investigative stop.”).

An officer may ask a lawfully detained person “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” State v. Michelson, 160 N.H. 270, 274 (2010); see State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 531 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).

State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 531 (1985) (officer “may take whatever additional action which would warrant a man of reasonable caution under the circumstances to take” (quotations omitted)); State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 595-96 (1985) (questioning within scope because officer’s suspicion not yet dispelled and stop lasted three minutes); Glaude, 13

The officer’s suspicion must have a particularized and objective basis in order to warrant that intrusion on protected privacy rights.

The officer’s suspicion must have a particularized and objective basis in order to warrant that intrusion on protected privacy rights.

State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 530, 503 A.2d 809, 812 (1985) (State has strong interest in the protection of children).

Evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual contact with the victim was relevant to and probative of his intent, at the time of the Belknap County incident, to touch her for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

In order to be successful on appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was “clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [the defendant’s] case.” State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985), quoted in State v. Johnson supra.

State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 529, 503 A.2d 809, 811 (1985) (addressing State and Federal Constitutions); State v. Oxley, 127 N.H. 407, 410, 503 A.2d 756, 759 (1985) (addressing Federal Constitution).

To justify such a stop, the State must show that there existed a particularized and objective basis for believing that the person detained was, or was about to be, engaged in some criminal activity.

Since State and federal constitutional law with regard to investigative stops are identical, State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 529, 503 A.2d 809, 811 (1985), we need not make any separate federal analysis as to this issue.

State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985); State v. Avery, 126 N.H. 208, 213, 490 A.2d 1350, 1354 (1985); State v. Barker, 117 N.H. at 546, 374 A.2d at 1180.

State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985) (probative value not clearly outweighed by prejudicial effect); see also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (under Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 analysis appropriate in Rule 404(b) determination).

Compare United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984) (evidence of prior crimes inadmissible to prove intent because intent was not in issue), with State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985) (prior sexual assault on victim admissible to prove defendant’s intent where charged offense was attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault because defendant’s state of mind was in issue).

State constitutional law is identical to the law of its federal counterpart in this case, see State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 529, 503 A.2d 809, 811 (1985), and we therefore will analyze and decide the defendant’s claims under the State Constitution without making a separate federal analysis.

This evaluation is a subject for the trial court’s discretionary judgment, and we will not reverse without a demonstration that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the evidence.

The trial court’s decision to admit evidence of a prior offense “will constitute an abuse-of discretion only if ‘clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [the defendant’s] case.’” State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 503 A.2d 809 (1985) (quoting State v. Whitney, 125 N.H. 636, 639, 484 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1984)).