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Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Theresa S. v. Superintendent of Youth Development Center, 489 A.2d 592.

15 citing documents.

  • In Re the Liquidation of the Home Insurance 953 A.2d 443 N.H. 2008
    It is mandatory, not permissive, language.” Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55 (1985).
  • New Hampshire Department of Resources & Economic Development v. Dow 803 A.2d 581 N.H. 2002
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55 (1985).
  • Town of Tilton v. State 629 A.2d 791 N.H. 1993
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Penrich, Inc. v. Sullivan 620 A.2d 1037 N.H. 1993
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Maciejczyk v. Maciejczyk 592 A.2d 1140 N.H. 1991
    King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (citation omitted); see Theresa S. v. Superintendent of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Appeal of Higgins-Brodersen 578 A.2d 868 N.H. 1990
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • State v. Elwell 567 A.2d 1002 N.H. 1989
    In interpreting the plain meaning of this statute, see Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985), we find that the boundaries of the privilege extend beyond communications and encompass the “confidential relations” which exist between physician and patient.
  • State v. Bruce 566 A.2d 1144 N.H. 1989
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985) (citations omitted).
  • In re Doe 564 A.2d 433 N.H. 1989
    To resolve the statutory arguments, principles of statutory interpretation require us to look first to the statutory language itself, In re John Kevin B., 129 N.H. 286, 288, 525 A.2d 281, 282-83 (1987), and to construe the law in a manner consistent with *277 its plain meaning, when possible, Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Suburban Realty, Inc. v. Albin 559 A.2d 1332 N.H. 1989
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • In re Noah W. 549 A.2d 1210 N.H. 1988
    *55 There are, however, objections to this position, given the standard of statutory construction by reference to the plain meaning of the language employed, see DeCato Brothers, Inc. v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 129 N.H. 504, 508, 529 A.2d 952, 954 (1987), considering the statute as a whole, see Theresa S. v. Sup’t YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Appeal of New Hampshire Catholic Charities 546 A.2d 1085 N.H. 1988
    “[T]he meaning of a statute is determined from its construction as a whole and not by the construction of isolated words and phrases.” In re John Kevin B., 129 N.H. 286, 288, 525 A.2d 281, 283 (1987) (quoting King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985)); Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • In re Jessica J. 546 A.2d 1056 N.H. 1988
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).
  • Town of Rye v. Public Service Co. 540 A.2d 1233 N.H. 1988
    Theresa S. v. Sup’t of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985); Dover Professional Fire Officers Assoc.
  • In re John Kevin B. 525 A.2d 281 N.H. 1987
    When interpreting a statute, the touchstone of legislative intent is the statutory language itself, Feuerstein v. Gilmore d/b/a Reprographics, 127 N.H. 715, 716, 506 A.2d 327, 328 (1986), and when possible, a statute should be construed consistently with the plain meaning of its language, Theresa S. v. Sup’t. of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985).